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“SACRIFICE AND RECOUPMENT” IN
THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PATENT
SETTLEMENTS: ACTAVIS THROUGH
THE LENS OF BROOKE GROUP, ASPEN
SKIING, AND TRINKO
BRYAN GANT*
Patent settlements are typically procompetitive, benefiting not only
the settling parties but also the courts and the general public. But in rare
cases patent settlements might instead harm competition, and thus raise
antitrust concerns. How are courts to determine when antitrust scrutiny
should — and, more importantly, should not — be applied to patent
settlements?
The answer ostensibly came in the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc. Under Actavis, antitrust scrutiny of patent
settlements may “sometimes” be appropriate where there is a “large,”
“unexplained” “reverse payment” from the patentee to the patent
challenger. Unless, that is, the “reverse payment” is “fair value,”
represents “saved litigation costs,” or is a “traditional” or
“commonplace” way to settle. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not
define any of these terms, and Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent thus
could only wish “good luck to the district courts” asked to interpret the
decision, many of whom have struggled to do so.
But the key “mysteries” of Actavis can all be solved by recognizing
that Actavis follows a line of antitrust cases that ask whether an alleged
monopolist made an otherwise-irrational sacrifice in expectation of
recouping anticompetitive benefits. This Article therefore places Actavis
within the same legal framework as predatory pricing cases like Brooke
Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco and refusal to deal cases like
Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing and Verizon Communications
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko. In doing so, the article explains the
* Bryan Gant is a partner in the Global Competition Group of White & Case LLP and
represents defendants in ongoing cases involving Actavis. The views expressed herein
are his own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of White & Case or its clients. He
would like to thank Professor Daniel Sokol, Tripp Odom, and Helen J. Gant for their
comments and suggestions.
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hidden underpinnings of Actavis, solves the apparent mysteries that have
baffled the lower courts, and offers a roadmap to courts seeking to
properly apply antitrust scrutiny to patent settlements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have long recognized the benefits of settlement, which allows
parties to avoid costly litigation, facilitates compromises the parties could
not achieve through the binary win-or-lose litigation process, and avoids
unduly burdening courts and the general public.1 Patent settlements in
particular have the potential to further benefit consumers by using an
agreement made prior to the patent’s expiration to create a path to the market
for a challenger who might not have succeeded otherwise.2
However, the Supreme Court has held that at least some limited forms of
patent settlement could instead delay a patent challenger’s entry into the
market, and thus such settlements may “sometimes” raise antitrust concerns,
at least in certain circumstances.3 How, then, are courts to determine when
it is appropriate to apply antitrust scrutiny to a patent settlement, and when
it is not appropriate?
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.4 tried to
answer this question, but in doing so created substantial confusion.5 Actavis
held that patent settlements may “sometimes” be suspect under antitrust
laws, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, when they involve “large”
“unexplained” “reverse payments” from the patentee to the patent
challenger, because (the Court held) such payments risk delaying a patent
challenger’s entry into the market and suggest that the patentee may have the
market power to exclude competition.6 Or, at least, Actavis held that such
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 153 (2013) (“We recognize the
value of settlements and the patent litigation problem.”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 305 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that generally,
settlements are favorable); Williams v. First Nat’l Bank of Pauls Valley, 216 U.S. 582,
595 (1910) (looking favorably upon the use of compromise to resolve disputes); St. Louis
Mining & Milling Co. v. Mont. Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898) (“[S]ettlements
of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to litigation, are generally
favored . . . .”); Am. Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (acknowledging the prevalent public policy in favor of parties voluntarily settling
their litigation matters); TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 461 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting the “paramount policy of encouraging settlements”).
2. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154 (“[S]ettlement on terms permitting the patent challenger
to enter the market before the patent expires would also bring about competition, again
to the consumer’s benefit.”).
3. See id. at 141, 158–59.
4. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
5. See generally id. (holding that reverse payment settlements can sometimes
violate antitrust laws because they can create “unfair restraints on trade”).
6. Id. at 141 (“[R]everse payment settlements such as the agreement alleged in the
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settlements can be suspect under the antitrust laws so long as they are not
“traditional,” “commonplace,” or “fair value” and do not represent payment
only of the patentee’s saved or avoided litigation costs.7
If the reader is confused at this point, they are in very good company. For
example, just what is a “reverse payment?” What do the terms “large,”
“unexplained,” “traditional,” “commonplace,” or “fair value” mean, and
why are such payments not suspect?8 Why can a patentee “pay” its saved or
avoided litigation costs to settle, when other types of payment are potentially
suspect? And on what basis could a court infer market power from a reverse
payment? Actavis never answers any of these questions, and indeed never
even defines the central terms (like “reverse payment”) that might help
explain its ruling.9 Justice Roberts in dissent thus could only wish “[g]ood
luck to the district courts” applying Actavis,10 and it is fair to say that courts
have struggled to understand and apply it as the Supreme Court intended.
But all these “mysteries” can be solved simply by recognizing that in
Actavis the Court applied the same basic “sacrifice and recoupment”
framework that it had previously used in predatory pricing cases such as

complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”); id. at 157 (“[W]here a
reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely
possesses the [market] power to bring that harm about in practice.”); id. (“An
unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has
serious doubts about the patent’s survival.”); id. at 158 (“In sum, a reverse payment,
where large and unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive
effects . . . .”).
7. Id. at 152 (“In the traditional examples cited above, a party with a claim (or
counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the value of its claim.”);
id. (“Insofar as the dissent urges that settlements taking these commonplace forms have
not been thought for that reason alone subject to antitrust liability, we agree, and do not
intend to alter that understanding.”); id. at 156 (“The reverse payment, for example, may
amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through
the settlement. That payment may reflect compensation for other services that the
generic has promised to perform — such as distributing the patented item or helping to
develop a market for that item. There may be other justifications.”); id. (“Where a
reverse payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation
costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of
noninfringement.”); id. at 159 (“[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”).
8. See, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 402, 416
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Actavis did not identify any specific formula for determining whether
a reverse payment is sufficiently large.”).
9. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 160 (“We therefore leave to the lower courts the
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
10. Id. at 173 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco11 and refusal to deal cases
such as Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.12 and Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.13 In Brooke
Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko, the Supreme Court held that antitrust
liability could apply only if the alleged monopolists made large sacrifices —
below cost pricing or the termination of a prior profitable course of dealing
— that would have been economically irrational unless “recouped” through
the harm or delay they imposed on a rival.14 Actavis likewise involved an
alleged sacrifice by the patentee (a “reverse payment”) that might be
recouped through the delayed entry of a patent challenger, and thus follows
the same sacrifice and recoupment framework the Court had previously
established for other forms of antitrust conduct.15
Recognizing this sacrifice and recoupment framework solves five
“mysteries” that have troubled courts since the Actavis decision:
First Mystery. The first “mystery” of Actavis is simply what qualifies as
a “reverse payment,” i.e., conduct that might sometimes make certain patent
settlements subject to antitrust scrutiny. The answer is that because Actavis,
like Brooke Group, Trinko, and Aspen Skiing, uses an alleged monopolist’s
willingness to incur short-run losses to suggest the possibility of a long-run
anticompetitive effect, it first requires showing that there was such a shortrun sacrifice. As explained in Part III, a reverse payment is therefore best
understood as a large sacrifice by the patentee that benefits the patent
challenger, which the patentee would not rationally have been willing to
make if it did not expect to receive some anticompetitive benefit in return,
and which therefore can be used by a court to infer the potential for patent
weakness, market power, and anticompetitive effect.
Second Mystery. Actavis holds that “fair value” agreements should not be
treated as anticompetitive.16 But what is a “fair value” agreement? The
answer, as explained in Part IV, is likely an agreement that lacks what makes
a reverse payment potentially suspect in the first place: a large, unexplained
11.
12.
13.
14.

509 U.S. 209 (1993).
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
While Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko all involved claims under
Sherman Act § 2 (monopolization), Actavis involved the related question of whether a
patent monopoly was lawful or unlawful — and thus, the sacrifice and recoupment test’s
application in an FTC Act § 5 (or for that matter Sherman Act § 1) context is not
surprising.
15. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140.
16. Id. at 156 (“Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement
considerations, such as . . . fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a
patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding
of noninfringement.”).
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sacrifice by the patentee. But in answering this question, the fair value
inquiry raises another one: What does it mean to make a sacrifice under
Actavis or, put differently, a sacrifice relative to what? As explained in Part
IV.A, the sacrifice cannot merely be a sacrifice relative to an ideal
hypothetical alternative agreement that might have been entered, because not
only are profit-maximizing “market value” alternatives often illusory, the
Supreme Court in Brooke Group and Trinko rejected the idea of applying
antitrust scrutiny based on a company’s failure to maximize profits and
instead looked for a sacrifice in absolute terms.17 Nor, as explained in Part
IV.B, must the agreement have been entered solely for the benefit of the
patentee in order to be fair value, as the Federal Trade Commission has
argued based on misreading Actavis. Rather, as explained in Part IV.C, a
fair value agreement is one that lacks a large, unexplained patentee sacrifice
in absolute terms — i.e., that lacks a true, out-of-pocket sacrifice in the same
sense as in Brooke Group and Aspen Skiing/Trinko.
Third Mystery. Actavis also holds that where there is a large, unexplained
reverse payment, the patentee “likely” has sufficient market power for such
a payment to cause anticompetitive harm.18 But if we mistakenly think of a
reverse payment as something received by the patent challenger, as some do,
the idea that a benefit to the patent challenger can show market power for
the patentee is a baffling non sequitur. Why should the fact that Party A
receives value suggest that Party B has market power? As discussed in Part
V, however, this inference of potential market power is less baffling if a
reverse payment is viewed first as a sacrifice by the patentee in the same vein
as the sacrifices in Brooke Group and Aspen Skiing — as one might initially
infer that a purported monopolist would only make such a sacrifice if it has
the market power to recoup that sacrifice through extended market
exclusivity. Finally, this conclusion also makes clear that any such inference
of market power is rebuttable, just as in Brooke Group — which ultimately
requires not just inferring the possibility of recoupment by the monopolist,
but showing that any such recoupment is possible.19
17. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223–26 (1993); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–10, 415–16.
18. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157 (noting that “where a reverse payment threatens to work
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that
harm about in practice”).
19. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226 (concluding that recoupment and competitive
injury must be based not only on “below-cost pricing” but also on “an estimate of the
cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the scheme alleged by the
plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market”). Notably, Brooke
Group addressed the standards applicable at trial; Actavis concerns the standards a court
should apply at a motion to dismiss — and an inference drawn at the motion to dismiss
stage should not be permitted to become irrebuttable at trial. See infra Part V.B.
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Fourth Mystery. Actavis held that a payment from the patentee to the
challenger that merely approximates the patentee’s saved or avoided
litigation costs would not raise antitrust concerns.20 But why not, given that
such a payment (1) apparently could be made in cash (which Actavis
otherwise thought suspect), and (2) would surely be a benefit to the patent
challenger, which not only receives a payment from the patentee but also
saves its own litigation costs?21 The answer, as explained in Part VI, is
simply that there is no sacrifice in paying your opponent the same amount to
settle as you would have otherwise paid your lawyers to litigate, and
therefore nothing to “recoup” under the sacrifice and recoupment
framework.
Fifth Mystery. Actavis took pains to distinguish a “large” “unexplained”
“reverse payment” from a “traditional” compromise that the majority says
should not raise antitrust concerns.22 But why should “traditional” forms of
compromise be exempt from the antitrust scrutiny of Actavis? As explained
in Part VII, the Court has long used the “form” of conduct as a guardrail to
protect procompetitive conduct in sacrifice and recoupment cases, such as
by requiring that the plaintiff show below-cost pricing in Brooke Group or a
prior profitable course of dealing in Trinko before subjecting traditionally
procompetitive conduct to the potentially deterring effects of antitrust
scrutiny.23 The Court in Actavis similarly protected longstanding forms of
procompetitive settlement from antitrust scrutiny by excluding forms of
settlement that have not traditionally been considered problematic or likely
to raise anticompetitive concerns.24
Applying the sacrifice and recoupment framework used in Brooke Group,
Aspen Skiing, and Trinko therefore solves the five major mysteries of Actavis
and permits a court to apply the decision as the Supreme Court must have
intended.

20. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (noting that reverse payments based on costs that may
otherwise have occurred, such as litigation costs, do not raise concerns about the misuse
of monopoly profits).
21. See id. at 152 (noting that a “money” payment by the patentee to the patent
challenger is “quite different” from a traditional settlement).
22. Id. (detailing the stark difference between a “traditional example” of a
settlement, in which the claiming party receives “the value of its claim,” and a “reverse
payment settlement,” in which a party with no damages claim receives payment to “stay
away from the patentee’s market”).
23. See infra Part VII; Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222; Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
24. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156.
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II. BROOKE GROUP, ASPEN SKIING, AND TRINKO: USING SACRIFICE AND
RECOUPMENT TO IDENTIFY SUSPECT CONDUCT
Using a Monopolist’s Sacrifice to Suggest the Possibility of
Recoupment Through Anticompetitive Effects
The Supreme Court has long held that a short-run sacrifice by an alleged
monopolist can sometimes suggest the potential for recoupment of that
sacrifice through long-run anticompetitive effects.25 In “predatory pricing”
cases, for example, a monopolist is alleged to price below its costs, making
a short-run sacrifice, with the expectation that doing so will drive its less
well-heeled rivals out of the market and thus allow the monopolist to then
raise its prices to supracompetitive levels.26 However, the Supreme Court
has further held, in cases such as Brooke Group, that such pricing can be
actionable only if “the competitor had . . . a dangerous probability
of . . . recouping its investment in below-cost prices,” i.e., if (a) the conduct
is capable of driving off current competitors and (b) the market is susceptible
to sustained monopoly pricing following the victim’s exit because
competitors will not simply flood in as prices increase.27
25. This is not to say, however, that the Supreme Court would treat all profit
sacrifices as suspect, and much less as antitrust violations. Rather, as the Seventh Circuit
has noted, a profit sacrifice is merely “helpful” to identifying suspect conduct — and not
itself an antitrust problem. Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 462 (7th Cir.
2020) (explaining why “profit sacrifice is neither [a] necessary nor sufficient” element
of antitrust claims, but merely “helpful” to identifying suspect conduct). Indeed, there
are many circumstances where it would be wholly inappropriate to measure
anticompetitive conduct by whether or not it involved an initial profit sacrifice — such
as research and development into new products, which requires a short term sacrifice for
long term gain but is obviously procompetitive. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
COMPETITION & MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT 39–43 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009
/05/11/236681.pdf.
26. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“[P]redatory pricing schemes require conspirators to
suffer losses in order eventually to realize their illegal gains . . . .”); Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (defining predatory pricing as “pricing
below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competitors in the
short run and reducing competition in the long run”); Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975) (describing “the classically-feared case of predation”
as deliberately foregoing present revenues to rid the market of competitors and
“recouping the losses” in the later absence of market rivals; therefore, predation “cannot
exist” without “a temporary sacrifice of net revenues in the expectation of greater future
gains”).
27. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224–26; see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 325–26 (2007); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v.
FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If there is no likelihood of recoupment,

244

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:2

Sacrifice and recoupment also are at the heart of refusal to deal
jurisprudence. In Aspen Skiing, the alleged monopolist — controlling three
of the four ski mountains in the Aspen area — refused to continue dealing
with its one-mountain competitor despite a prior, profitable course of
dealing, and further refused to sell its competitor lift tickets even at a retail
price.28 The effect was potentially to drive the one-mountain competitor out
of business, as it could not effectively compete without offering consumers
a multi-mountain lift ticket. The Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, noting that in refusing to deal the defendant “was willing to
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a
perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.”29 In Trinko, the Supreme
Court further explained that in Aspen Skiing the alleged monopolist’s
“unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable)
course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to
achieve an anticompetitive end.”30 Trinko therefore understood Aspen Skiing
to involve a short-run sacrifice by the monopolist that it could expect to
recoup through long-run anticompetitive effects.31
The Guardrails of Brooke Group and Trinko: Form and Intent
Based Screens Against Over-Enforcement
Predatory pricing and refusals to deal thus may sometimes violate the
antitrust laws. However, as discussed in more detail in Part VII below,
antitrust scrutiny must be applied carefully in this area because these cases
also involve conduct that would, in most cases, be seen as procompetitive
and beneficial: Low pricing (in the case of predatory pricing) and
independent business decisions (in the case of refusals to deal with a rival).32
it would seem improbable that a scheme would be launched.”); Dial A Car, Inc. v.
Transp., Inc., 82 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rebel Oil v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d
1421, 1438, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995).
28. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 593–94
(1985).
29. Id. at 610–11; see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075
(10th Cir. 2013) (explaining refusal to deal jurisprudence).
30. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S 398,
409 (2004); see also Novell, 731 F.3d at 1073–75 (explaining how courts adopt rules in
predatory pricing and refusal to deal contexts).
31. See, e.g., Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 675–76 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (citing Brooke Group in a refusal to deal case for the principle that conduct
can violate the antitrust laws if it is “predatory”).
32. See infra Part VII; see, e.g., Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224 (avoiding antitrust
scrutiny that would risk becoming “an obstacle to the chain of events most conducive to
a breakdown of oligopoly pricing and the onset of competition”); Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414
(weighing the benefits of intervention against the various costs of intervention);
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The Supreme Court therefore sought to avoid deterring such procompetitive
conduct by over-enforcement of the antitrust laws, and did so by applying
two important antitrust guardrails: form and intent.
First, the Supreme Court in Brooke Group and Trinko instituted important
form-based guardrails limiting the types of conduct that might raise antitrust
suspicions. For example, Brooke Group addressed so-called predatory
pricing, i.e., pricing that is “too low” and that harms competition as a result.
Low pricing is of course the very essence of competition, however.33 Any
less efficient competitor could, in theory, claim that its more efficient
opponent’s low pricing threatened to drive the less efficient competitor out
of the market, and thus that the more efficient competitor should be
compelled to raise its prices. Even if such a suit might not succeed, the mere
threat of antitrust liability for lowering prices would risk discouraging
efficient competitors from doing so. To avoid this result, the Supreme Court
limited antitrust scrutiny of low pricing (perhaps absent bundling or other
potential antitrust causes of action) only to below cost pricing, as that form
of pricing might suggest the potential for anticompetitive effect, and thus
ultimately be more likely to potentially raise antitrust concerns.34
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (noting that
mistaken intervention may be costly as lowering prices is often “the very essence of
competition”); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990) (quoting
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986)) (“It is in the interest of
competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price
competition.”); Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 320 (stating that the “costs of erroneous
findings of predatory-pricing liability are quite high” and could “chill the very conduct
the antitrust laws are designed to protect”); Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory
Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court’s approach to
predatory pricing, by focusing on potentially successful predation, may not capture
conduct that some authors would view as suspect); Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying
Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 977 (1986) (“[F]alse positives are
much more harmful than false negatives. Market processes undercut monopolies
wrongfully permitted, but no similar processes undercut judicial decisions that wrongly
condemn efficient conduct.”).
33. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224–27.
34. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594; see also Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222; Atl.
Richfield, 495 U.S. at 337–38, 341 (“Cutting prices . . . is the essence of competition.”);
Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Thomas
A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688, 1705 (2005))
(“Brooke Group’s safe harbor for above-cost discounting in the single product discount
context is not based on a theory that above-cost pricing strategies can never be
anticompetitive, but rather on a cost-benefit rejection of a more nuanced rule.”); id.
(quoting Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688,
1705 (2005)) (“[A]ny consumer benefit created by a rule that permits inquiry into abovecost, single-product discounts, but allows judicial condemnation of those deemed
legitimately exclusionary, would likely be outweighed by the consumer harm occasioned
by overdeterring nonexclusionary discounts”); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d
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Similarly, in Trinko, the Supreme Court worried that overly restricting the
right of a company to choose its business partners could not only impair the
ability to structure businesses in competitive ways, but indeed actively
promote collusion.35 The Court further recognized the limitations lower
courts face in making such economic decisions, such as which business
partners a company should choose; simply put, “courts are of limited utility
in examining difficult economic problems.”36 Trinko thus limited antitrust
scrutiny to refusals to deal involving the termination of a prior profitable
course of dealing and/or a refusal to sell a competitor a product otherwise
available at retail — conduct that was reasonably identifiable and might
provide insight into the monopolist’s anticompetitive expectations.37 The
“form” of the conduct therefore serves as a guardrail to protect competition
from over-enforcement of the antitrust laws in both these cases.
Second, the Supreme Court in these cases used “intent” as a screen to help
assess the likely competitive effect of the conduct, and to thereby determine
if antitrust scrutiny might be appropriate. For example, in Aspen Skiing the
monopolist’s sacrifice suggested “a distinctly anticompetitive bent,” as the
monopolist would not ordinarily have refused to continue receiving profits
from a profitable course of dealing, or refused sales at retail price, if it did
not receive a greater benefit from harm to competition. Thus, the Supreme
Court would later explain in Trinko, antitrust scrutiny was appropriate.38
However, it is important to remember that intent will not substitute for
254, 274–75 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555
U.S. 438, 452 (2009)) (“[A]lthough there may be rare cases where above-cost prices are
anticompetitive in the long run, it is ‘beyond the practical ability’ of courts to identify
those rare cases without creating an impermissibly high risk of deterring legitimate
procompetitive behavior (i.e., price-cutting).”).
35. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410, 415–16; see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“[T]he [Sherman] [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right
of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal . . . .”).
36. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
37. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409–10; In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d
128, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting no duty to deal absent evidence of profit sacrifice); ASAP
Paging Inc. v. CenturyTel of San Marcos, Inc., 137 F. App’x 694, 698–99 (5th Cir. 2005)
(holding no antitrust claim where the monopolist’s refusal to deal permitted it to realize
short term gains). Compare Metronet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1131–
33 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no obligation to continue unprofitable dealing), with
Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-cv-5486, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24213, at
*12–13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2017) (“Neither is it unimaginable that a monopolist might
wish to withdraw from a prior course of dealing and suffer a short-term profit loss in
order to pursue perfectly competitive ends.”). But see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 370–72, 377–78 (1973) (finding liability where monopolist refused
to provide services to competitor despite offering them to all others).
38. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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unlawful conduct, and that conduct must be shown before a court can ask
why the parties engaged in it.39 In other words, it is not enough for a court
simply to determine that an alleged monopolist intended to harm rivals;
“sharp elbows” are expected in competition.40 Rather, a court must first
identify conduct that might harm competition.
III. A REVERSE PAYMENT REQUIRES (1) A PATENTEE SACRIFICE THAT
MIGHT BE RECOUPED THROUGH ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS AND (2) A
BENEFIT TO THE PATENT CHALLENGER
With this background, we turn to the first mystery of Actavis. Actavis
holds that a so-called “reverse payment” in connection with a patent
settlement — i.e., one in which the patentee “pays” the patent challenger to
drop its patent challenge — can sometimes raise antitrust concerns.41 But
what qualifies as a suspect “reverse payment?”42
The courts have struggled to answer this question, when they sought to
answer it at all. Because Actavis provides no definition, much of the initial
debate centered around whether a reverse payment must be made in cash or
whether other forms of “value” might suffice.43 While the Supreme Court in
Actavis might well have meant to define a reverse payment as a payment of

39. See infra note 136 (collecting authority for the proposition that a “bad” intent
cannot transform lawful conduct into unlawful conduct under the antitrust laws).
40. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 1005 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Tension Envelope Corp. v. JBM Envelope Co., 876 F.3d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 2017))
(stating that the defendant “has also ‘acted with sharp elbows — as businesses often
do’”).
41. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 152–59 (2013).
42. Because Actavis (and most cases applying it) involved patent settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry, it is common in these cases to refer to the patentee as the
“brand” (i.e., the branded pharmaceutical manufacturer) and the patent challenger as the
“generic” (i.e., the generic pharmaceutical manufacturer challenging the brand’s
patents). See id. at 141 (“Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation . . . .”). However,
nothing in Actavis limits the reach of the decision to this one particular industry, and
some aspects of the decision are easier to understand in a more general framework. See
Spex Techs., Inc. v. Kingston Tech. Corp., No. SACV 16-1790, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
228888, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2019) (rejecting the argument that Actavis is
limited to Hatch-Waxman Act litigation). This Article therefore tries to avoid the
industry-specific “brand/generic” terminology in favor of the more generally-applicable
terms “patentee/patent challenger.”
43. Compare, e.g., In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d
560, 569 (D.N.J. 2014) (limiting reverse payments to cash), with In re Nexium
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013) (“Nowhere
in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require some sort of monetary
transaction . . . .”), and In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 750–751 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (agreeing that a reverse payment does not need to be exclusively made in cash).
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cash or close equivalents,44 courts have generally declined to adopt that
approach and have instead expanded Actavis to apply to the payment of other
forms of value that do not involve the payment of cash by the patentee.45
Unfortunately, though, many courts stop there, concluding that a reverse
payment need not be in cash but failing to offer any other way to identify
agreements that might potentially raise antitrust concerns, and thus, like the
Supreme Court in Actavis, stop short of actually defining the term “reverse
payment.”46
However, the meaning of “reverse payment” is apparent if a court analyzes
Actavis from the perspective of Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko,
i.e., looks for a sacrifice that the alleged monopolist rationally would have
made only if it expected to recoup that forfeiture through the exclusion of
competition or some other anticompetitive effect. Actavis suggests that a
court can infer from a reverse payment that (a) the patent at issue was weak
(see Part III below),47 (b) the patentee has market power (see Part V), and,
then, (c) ultimately there was the potential to “recoup” the reverse payment
through anticompetitive effects.48 As explained below, and as is generally
recognized, only a patentee’s sacrifice would permit each of these inferences,
and thus support the Supreme Court’s reasoning, i.e., just as in Brooke

44. The Supreme Court made clear that a patent challenger “walk[ing] away with
money simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market” is “quite different” from
traditional forms of settlement. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152. Thus, the majority opinion not
only contains multiple references to “money” and “dollars,” but also can be read to
distinguish “traditional” settlements from “unusual” reverse payments based on the fact
that in unusual reverse payments, unlike with traditional settlements that may provide
value to both sides, there is cash or money flowing to the patent challenger. Id. at 152,
156 (discussing a reverse payment “in which A, the plaintiff, pays money to defendant
B” and in which the defendant “walks away with money”). The distinction between
monetary and non-monetary “payments” may therefore be a form-based guardrail similar
to those discussed in Part VII below, such as limiting predatory pricing to “below cost”
pricing — though this view has not been accepted by the courts. See infra Part VII.
45. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 392
(noting that, in discussing reverse payments, the Actavis Court did not specify the
necessity for a cash payment).
46. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (discussing, but failing to define “reverse payment”);
see, e.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388,
401 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the Actavis Court’s conclusion caused uncertainty in
antitrust litigation).
47. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157–58 (requiring payment capable of serving as a
“workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness”); see also id. at 154–55 (noting that “a high
reverse payment signal[s] to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks
confidence in its patent”).
48. See id. at 147 (describing a reverse payment as something the patentee could
“recoup” through the exercise of the patent exclusivity).
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Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko, only a sacrifice by the monopolist can
suggest recoupment through anticompetitive effects.49
The “Actavis Inference” Seeks to Identify Conduct That
Suggests Patent Weakness, Market Power, and Ultimately
Potential Anticompetitive Effect
To understand Actavis, and how the Supreme Court’s decision fits into its
prior antitrust jurisprudence, we must first understand what Actavis was
trying to accomplish. Although settlement is typically procompetitive, and
avoids litigation costs and wasting judicial resources, Actavis addressed the
following situation that might, in theory, instead harm competition:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies
settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not
to produce the patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2)
Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars. Because the
settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than
the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a
“reverse payment” settlement agreement. And the basic question here is
whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish
competition in violation of the antitrust laws.50

The challenge in answering the Supreme Court’s question is the
uncertainty that surrounds the patent at issue, in light of the fact that the
parties settled.51 On one hand, if a court would have considered the patent
valid and infringed, then the settlement cannot have harmed competition, at
49. The need for a patentee sacrifice is well-recognized, though its importance to the
Actavis analysis is not yet universally understood. See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp.,
791 F.3d at 405 (asking whether “the source of the benefit to the claimed infringer is
something costly to the patentee”); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 3d
307, 332 (D.R.I. 2017) (“The text of Actavis suggests that the Court should consider both
[the perspective of the patentee and alleged infringer] in considering an alleged unlawful
reverse payment.”); Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16,
18 (“Where the payment takes a form other than a simple cash transfer from the patentee
to the claimed infringer, consideration should be valued from the perspective of the
patentee.”); Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 RUTGERS
L. REV. 585, 594 (2015) [hereinafter Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference] (“[F]or noncash
reverse payments, the courts should seek to measure the dollar value sacrificed by the
patent holder as a result of the agreement it reached with the alleged infringer.”); Bryan
Gant, Understanding Actavis: How Courts Misinterpret FTC v. Actavis, Inc., and How
to Get It Right, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 111, 125–29 (2016) (approaching the issue
from a bargaining perspective and explaining why the Court’s focus on patentee sacrifice
protects bargaining and settlement).
50. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 140–41.
51. See id. at 171–72 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (explaining that just as with any “hard
legal question” the parties to a patent dispute do not know at the outset of litigation
whether the patent is valid; however, this “doesn’t mean there is no answer until a court
declares one”).
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least as long as the settlement is no more exclusive of competition than the
patent itself would be, i.e., as long as it is within the “scope of the patent.”52
Congress, moreover, has concluded that patents should be presumed valid.53
For this reason, several courts prior to Actavis applied the so-called “scope
of the patent test,” refusing to apply antitrust scrutiny to patent settlements
unless they extended exclusivity beyond the patent term.54 On the other
hand, however, if the patent would have been held invalid or not infringed,
then the patent challenger’s agreement to drop a meritorious challenge in
return for a large, unexplained reverse payment could perhaps harm
competition in at least some cases, at least theoretically, as, in theory, such
an outcome could permit a patentee to avoid the invalidation of a patent that
should have been invalidated.55
Whether a patent settlement risks harming competition and thus should be
subject to antitrust scrutiny therefore may depend on whether the patent at
issue in the underlying case was valid and infringed. But because the parties
settled, no court has actually answered that question. How, then, are courts
to know whether there is any basis for antitrust scrutiny of the patent
settlement in such a case, particularly without retrying the underlying patent
case at the motion to dismiss stage to determine whether the statutory
assumption of patent validity can be overcome?
Actavis purports to circumvent this problem, at least at the motion to
dismiss stage, by using the patentee’s conduct to infer something about the
likely expected outcome of the patent suit.56 Thus, the Supreme Court held
52. Id. at 171 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[S]ettling a patent claim cannot
possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive harm if the patent holder is acting within the
scope of a valid patent . . . .”).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid . . . . The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting
such invalidity.”).
54. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012)
(applying the “scope of the patent test”); see also In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).
55. See Brief for Petitioner at 46, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (No. 12416), 2013 WL 267027; see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 212–13 (3d
Cir. 2012) (noting that a rule favoring settlement may allow “less sound” patents or cases
of “less clear infringement” to continue when perhaps they should have been
invalidated). To be clear, this Article merely restates the argument here — and does not
necessarily agree that this argument is a correct one.
56. This should not be read to suggest that Actavis’s inference of patent weakness is
a correct one, and much less that it is irrebuttable. That a patentee might mistakenly
believe that its patent might be weak, or that a patentee might be averse to the risks of
litigation, does not make an ironclad patent any less ironclad. Any inference Actavis
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that an “unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest
that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival,” and could
be a “workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court
to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”57 And,
ultimately, such a “workable surrogate” could further suggest the possibility
that the patentee will succeed in excluding competition and recouping its
“unexplained large reverse payment.”58 This is the “Actavis inference,” as
later commentators have dubbed it, an inference of potential patent
weakness, and accordingly of potential anticompetitive effect, based on the
patentee’s willingness to make a large, unexplained reverse payment.59
Only a Sacrifice by the Patentee can Suggest Patent Weakness,
Market Power, or Anticompetitive Effect
The Actavis inquiry therefore needs its inference, its (supposedly)
“workable surrogate” for patent weakness, to establish any potential basis
for antitrust scrutiny, particularly in the face of a presumptively-valid
patent.60 And, as noted, Actavis draws this inference from a “reverse
payment.” A reverse payment therefore must be something capable of
draws should thus be viewed solely as preliminary, and certainly rebuttable. On the other
hand, even if an antitrust plaintiff were to prove that a patent the patentee believed valid
and infringed was in fact invalid or not infringed, the agreement — entered at a time
when there was a presumptively valid patent and no one had demonstrated otherwise —
would not therefore be transformed into an anticompetitive agreement, because antitrust
conduct is assessed as of the time it occurs. See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133
F. Supp. 3d 734, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d
Cir. 1981)) (“In conducting the rule of reason analysis, the Court will evaluate the
Wellbutrin Settlement’s reasonableness at the time it was entered into. The Court will
also evaluate the settlement as a whole, and not in a piecemeal, provision-by-provision
approach.”).
57. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157–58; see also id. at 154 (“[R]everse payment signal[s] to
other potential challengers that the patentee lacks confidence in its patent . . . .”).
58. Id. at 157 (“[W]here a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the [market] power to bring that harm
about in practice.”).
59. Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 49, at 594; Gant, supra note 49,
at 122–25.
60. That the patentee sacrifice is necessary to overcome the statutory presumption of
patent validity, and thus bring the case outside of the “scope of the patent” analysis used
prior to Actavis, refutes the suggestion by Edlin et al. that while “a sacrifice by the patent
holder is the primary focus of the present analysis, a sacrifice is not the only route to
establishing an anticompetitive effect.” Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note
49, at 594 n.28. Without a patentee sacrifice to serve as the “workable surrogate” under
Actavis, a court has no basis on which to conclude that any anticompetitive effects could
have occurred — because without this workable surrogate, there is simply a valid patent,
and a patent settlement that by all accounts was within the scope of that patent.

252

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:2

suggesting patent weakness, along with market power61 and the potential for
anticompetitive effect, i.e., whatever “reverse payment” means, it must
“normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s
survival” and be a “workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness.”62 So what
sort of agreement would provide that “workable surrogate” for patent
weakness and thus suggest the possibility of anticompetitive effects?
A Patentee Might Not Be Expected to Make a Large, Unexplained
Sacrifice It Could Not Then Recoup Through Anticompetitive
Effects
A short-term patentee sacrifice could serve as such a workable surrogate
in some cases, at least in theory,63 because the fact that the patentee made
such a sacrifice might suggest that the “patentee ha[d] serious doubts about
the patent’s survival.”64 The reasoning is that the patentee would not
ordinarily make a large sacrifice to settle if it felt it had no risk of losing the
patent case; thus, the fact that the patentee was willing to make such a
sacrifice could in some cases be taken as evidence, at least at the motion to
dismiss stage, that the patentee expected to recoup that sacrifice by avoiding
the perceived risk of patent invalidation.65 It therefore is the patentee’s
sacrifice that is the “workable surrogate” on which Actavis relies to infer the
potential for the patentee to “recoup” anticompetitive benefits.66 This, of
course, echoes the analyses in Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko, each
of which required a sacrifice to suggest the potential for an anticompetitive
effect. Indeed, Actavis notes that a reverse payment “amounts to a purchase
by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product,”67 language which

61. See infra Part V (explaining how a sacrifice allows an initial inference of market
power).
62. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157–58.
63. Again, accepting this premise for purposes of applying Actavis does not
necessarily mean agreeing with it. See, e.g., Gant, supra note 49, at 121 (explaining the
weakness of this inference, and why it must not be accepted as a final conclusion with
respect to anything under Actavis).
64. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157–58.
65. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 262
(D. Mass. 2014) (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and
the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 25 (2013)) (“[A]
large payment would be an irrational act unless the patentee believed that generic
production would cut into its profits.”).
66. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (describing a reverse payment as something the
patentee could “recoup” through the exercise of the patent exclusivity).
67. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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directly echoes Brooke Group’s comment that predatory pricing represents
an “investment in below-cost prices.”68
Actavis further focused on the recoupment of this sacrifice through
anticompetitive effects on the market, noting that the “patent, if valid and
infringed, might have permitted [the patentee] to charge drug prices
sufficient to recoup the reverse settlement payments.”69 Indeed, whether
such recoupment was possible was a key question in the decision; Actavis
noted that a practical question was whether the parties would “be able to
enter into such an anticompetitive agreement? Would not a high reverse
payment signal to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional challenges, perhaps
too many for the patentee to ‘buy off?”70 If so, then recoupment would not
be possible.71 The Court concluded however, that the structure of the HatchWaxman Act reduces the incentives of subsequent challengers to
meaningfully contest the validity of the patent, and thus, that driving out even
one challenger might allow recoupment through delayed generic entry.72
Finally, in Actavis the Court held that a patentee’s willingness to enter into
a large and unexplained reverse payment may sometimes suggest an
anticompetitive bent, asking if the “basic reason” for the agreement was “a
desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits.”73
Actavis thus echoes the intent discussion in Trinko, which addressed the
supposedly “anticompetitive bent” disclosed by refusing to continue a prior
profitable course of dealing with a rival.74 Having identified conduct that
might raise antitrust suspicions — a large, unexplained reverse payment —
Actavis, like Trinko, considers whether that conduct reveals an intent by the
alleged monopolist to delay competition, and uses that inference of intent to
help interpret potentially ambiguous conduct.
Actavis therefore follows the same framework of sacrifice and recoupment
as in Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko. While this area of the
68. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 212, 224
(1993) (emphasis added).
69. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 154–55.
71. See, e.g., Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224–26. Compare In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534–35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(concluding pre-Actavis that recoupment of a reverse payment is not possible because
other generics will then challenge the patent), with Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible
Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 25 (2004) (“If
there is good reason for believing the patent invalid others will try [to invalidate it].”).
72. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155.
73. Id. at 158.
74. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
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antitrust law has not yet seen a “Trinko” to explain the “Aspen Skiing” of
Actavis, courts applying Actavis should therefore look for the same type of
sacrifice required in prior Supreme Court sacrifice and recoupment cases.
A Benefit to the Patent Challenger Is Also Necessary, but No
Substitute for a Patentee Sacrifice
Before proceeding, however, we should pause to consider whether the
Actavis inference could be based on conduct other than a sacrifice by the
patentee. Most importantly, we might think that it would be possible to look
to whether the patent challenger received any benefit in connection with
settlement, and to ask if such a benefit could be a workable surrogate for a
weak patent. But in fact, such a benefit, while necessary for there to have
been a “payment” at all, is of little use in determining the potential for patent
weakness and anticompetitive effect under Actavis.75
A Benefit to the Patent Challenger Is Also Necessary to Show a
Large, Unexplained Reverse Payment
Initially, it is certainly true that a benefit to the patent challenger is an
important part of the Actavis analysis, though such a benefit is necessary to
show potential anticompetitive conduct, not sufficient. It is true that there is
no way to infer that the patent challenger agreed to a later entry date (the
anticompetitive harm at issue in Actavis) without showing that it received
some benefit from the agreement that would encourage it to agree to such
delay. Because a payment requires a payor and a payee, if the challenger
received no benefit, then it can hardly be said that it was “paid” for delaying
entry.76 And the Court’s discussion of a benefit to the patent challenger in
Actavis is therefore unsurprising and does not refute in any way the
conclusion that a reverse payment also requires a patentee sacrifice. Rather,
because a reverse payment requires a patent challenger benefit as well as a

75. It has previously been shown that the mere fact that an agreement makes the
patent challenger more willing to compromise does not suggest anticompetitive effect.
See generally Gant, supra note 49.
76. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 145, 154 (alleging that the “true point of the payments was
to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete” and that such payments may
“induce” delay); id. at 152 (“A, the plaintiff, pays money to defendant B purely so B will
give up the patent fight.”); id. at 169 (“[A] party with no claim for damages . . . walks
away with money simply so it will stay away from the patentee’s market.”); id. at 154
(noting that sometimes payments are larger than what the challenger would earn in profits
if it won the patent challenge, thus the payment is essentially to “stay[] out of the
market”).
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patentee sacrifice, it would be odd if Actavis had not mentioned such a
benefit; both sides of the payment are required.77
However, a Benefit to the Patent Challenger Does Not Suggest
Patent Weakness
However, a benefit to the patent challenger is of comparatively little value
in the Actavis analysis because it cannot support the Actavis inference of
patent weakness; such a benefit simply tells us nothing about the strength or
weakness of the patent at issue. Simply put, a patent challenger would accept
a large benefit from a patentee with an ironclad patent just as surely as it
would accept the same benefit from a patentee with a weak patent; why
should it care?78 At most, a court might be able to look to the fact that the
challenger demanded a large payment as evidence that it viewed the patent
as potentially vulnerable, but this would be of minimal value both because

77. Nor can a benefit to the patent challenger be condemned based on the argument
that it alters the incentives of the patent challenger to settle. On this theory the state of
California passed a statute, Assembly Bill 824 (“AB 824”), which in some cases might
be said to require little more than a benefit to the patent challenger in order to raise an
inference of anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Kristen O’Shaughnessy, et al.,
California’s New Reverse Payment Law Departs from Supreme Court Standard in FTC
v. Actavis, WHITE & CASE (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/
alert/californias-new-reverse-payment-law-departs-supreme-court-standard-ftc-vactavis. But by focusing on the patent challenger’s benefit, rather than the patentee’s
sacrifice, this rule undermines “traditional” forms of settlement that allow the parties to
compromise between litigation expectations, as such compromises necessarily involve
value for both parties. See Gant, supra note 49, at 125–29.
Moreover, the California statute has a substantial preemption problem. Because
Actavis permits antitrust scrutiny of patents only where a large, unexplained reverse
payment can serve as a “workable surrogate” for patent weakness, and because the
“anything of value” to a patent challenger under AB 824 cannot serve as such a workable
surrogate, see infra Part III.B.ii.b–c (explaining why the generic benefit cannot serve as
a workable surrogate for patent weakness), an antitrust action under AB 824 must
proceed against the backdrop of a presumptively valid patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
Without any mechanism for invalidating or avoiding the rights granted under such a
patent, AB 824 therefore must shorten or ignore the patent rights granted by the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office — something the California state legislature has no power to
do. AB 824 is thus in direct conflict with federal patent law and preempted by the same.
78. See Gant, supra note 49, at 125.
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the challenger may have been bluffing,79 or even just wrong,80 and because
the important fact is not that the challenger asked for a large payment to settle
(rational to do in any hard bargaining situation), but rather that the patentee
thought it better to meet that demand than to litigate. That the patent
challenger agreed to receive a benefit therefore tells us nothing about the
strength or weakness of the patent — at least, as discussed above, unless that
benefit comes from a patentee sacrifice.
Similarly, it is not persuasive to suggest that a patentee would only provide
value to a patent challenger, even at no cost to itself, if it believed that its
patent was weak. On the contrary, a patentee with an absolutely ironclad
patent that can settle at no cost to itself, and with an entry date that respects
its patent term, would rationally do so regardless of the benefit its opponent
receives. Willingness to enter such a no-cost settlement cannot suggest
patent weakness regardless of how much the challenger receives.
For example, imagine a (purely hypothetical) patent that is 100% likely to
be upheld and found to be infringed. However, to prove the validity and
infringement of this perfect patent, the patentee will need to engage in a year
of litigation, with all the attendant costs and annoyances. Rather than
continuing litigation, though, the patent challenger offers to respect the full
term of the patent, i.e., give the patentee exactly what it wants, if the patentee
simply makes an introduction to a potential supplier that will save the patent
challenger tens of millions of dollars. Doing so costs the patentee nothing.
It would not be “irrational” or a “sacrifice” for the patentee to agree to such
a no-cost settlement, such that we could infer that it would only take this deal
if it was concerned about the strength of its patent and seeking to harm
competition. On the contrary, it might be irrational for the patentee to refuse
the challenger’s offer, and continue litigating for another year, just to deny
the patent challenger that benefit. And indeed, this is true virtually no matter
how much the patent challenger stands to benefit, or how strong the
patentee’s patent might be; why should the patentee care what the challenger
receives, when it has received what it wanted out of the exchange (its full
patent term) and given up nothing to get it?
79. United States v. Weimart, 819 F.3d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Bargaining ‘hard’
can include bluffs about negotiating positions.”); Dalton v. McCourt Elec., LLC, No. 123568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176582, at *13, n.2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2013) (quoting In
re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., No. 00 C 4729, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116934, at
*39 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009)) (“In the hurly-burly of negotiation, depending on the style
of the lawyer, it is not uncommon to encounter posturing, brinkmanship, bluster, puffing,
bluffing, braggadocio, and some sharp elbows.”).
80. See United Food & Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating Emps. Health &
Welfare Fund v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1179–80 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (“[A]ccess to imperfect information or overconfidence based on that imperfect
information . . . can impact settlements or willingness to enter settlements.”).
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We therefore cannot infer that a patentee would only permit a challenger
to receive a benefit if the patent was weak. On the contrary, a patentee would
rationally enter such a no-cost settlement regardless of the strength or
weakness of its patent. The “workable surrogate” for patent weakness in
Actavis therefore simply does not “work” when viewed solely from the
perspective of the patent challenger, as a benefit to the patent challenger
standing alone provides no insight into the strength of the patent.
Finally, by focusing primarily on the benefit to the patent challenger,
courts encounter the problem that prompted the Court in Actavis to call
reverse payments “unusual” and “quite different” from a traditional,
commonplace compromise.81 But what makes a reverse payment “unusual?”
It cannot be that the patent challenger benefits; most settlements provide both
parties with greater value than they expect to receive from litigating.82 Why
else would anyone ever settle? If a benefit to the patent challenger
transformed a normal settlement into a reverse payment settlement, then the
Supreme Court was simply wrong to call such settlements “unusual” — on
the contrary, they would be the norm.

A Benefit to the Patent Challenger Cannot Be Used as a
“Proxy” or Replacement for a Patentee Sacrifice
It might be asked, however, whether a benefit to the patent challenger
necessarily or ordinarily equates to a patentee sacrifice, such that if a plaintiff
can show such a benefit, it can be inferred that the benefit must have come
from a patentee sacrifice and thus that the patent might be weak. To see why
this is not so, consider three categories of contemporaneous agreements
likely to be entered alongside a patent settlement: (a) a mutually beneficial
“win-win” agreement,” (b) an agreement beneficial to one side at no cost to
the other (“win-neutral”), and (c) an agreement that harms one side to benefit

81. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147, 152.
82. See infra note 86 (collecting authority for the proposition that settlements

typically benefit both parties); see also, e.g., In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig., No.
13-CV-9244, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127748, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015) rev’d on
other grounds sub nom United Food & Com. Workers Loc. 1776 & Participating Emp.
Health & Welfare Fund v. Crosby Tugs, LLC, 848 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Asahi
Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003)) (focusing
solely on a benefit “would ignore the limiting principles set forth in [Actavis] and subject
virtually any settlement to antitrust scrutiny”); Kent Bernard, Hatch-Waxman Patent
Case Settlements — The Supreme Court Churns the Swamp, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
123, 131 (2014) (“[A]ny settlement agreement involves some sort of consideration to the
defendant . . . . Settlement, after all, is a compromise — not total surrender.”); Gant,
supra note 49, at 128–29 (explaining the importance of patent settlements and why the
Court declined to adopt an approach that would prevent parties from compromising
between their respective patent positions).
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the other (“win-lose”).83 While in all three scenarios at least one side
benefits, that benefit is not sufficient to show that the other side sacrificed
— on the contrary, the other side may also have benefited, thus negating any
suggestion of a sacrifice.84
Win-Win. Mutually beneficial agreements are one of the most
fundamental building blocks of trade. Such agreements are, in economic
terms, “Pareto superior,” meaning that they make at least one of the parties
better off and neither of the parties worse off,85 and are thus common ways
both to settle disputes and to enter into agreements generally.86 For example,
consider the purchase of a used car for $25,000. Intuitively, we might think
that the car was worth exactly $25,000 to everyone involved, because that
was the price paid. But this intuition is often wrong, because if everyone
agreed that the car was worth exactly $25,000 then why bother trading
$25,000 for $25,000? The answer is that the buyer values the car more
highly than $25,000 and would have (if necessary) been willing to pay up to
$30,000, while the store values the $25,000 more highly than the car as it
paid only $15,000 wholesale. From the store’s perspective, it has made
$10,000 in gross profit, while from the buyer’s perspective, she has enjoyed
a $5,000 “consumer surplus.”87
Far from “unusual,” such win-win agreements are both routine and fairly
easy to understand, and certainly cannot suggest irrational conduct.88
83. If the parties were, for some reason, to instead agree to terms that made one or
more side worse off and neither side better off — a “neutral-lose,” “lose-neutral,” or
“lose-lose” agreement — it would not transfer any value and thus not be a “payment.”
84. See Gant, supra note 49, at 125–29 (explaining the benefits of “integrative” or
win-win bargaining to reach an agreement in complex disputes).
85. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991) (examining the “Pareto optimality” and the “cost of
making transactions in a market economy”).
86. See, e.g., United States v. De La Mata, 535 F.3d 1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008)
(stating reasons why settlement of a forfeiture claim is mutually beneficial, including
saved litigation costs); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 729 (2d Cir.
1993) (stating the purpose of the class is to “facilitate the formation of a settlement that
will mutually benefit both [parties]”); Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. Am. Fed’n of
State, Cty. & Mun. Emp., Loc. 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1097 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that
settlement agreements are “presumably mutually beneficial”); Judkins v. HT Window
Fashion Corp., 529 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The fact that both [parties] took
from the settlement something of value points to a constructive, mutually beneficial
resolution to a legitimate dispute.”).
87. See, e.g., Ind. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Results, Inc., 513 F.3d
652, 658 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining consumer surplus); DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 71 (3d ed. 2000) (“Typically, consumers
value the goods they purchase above the amount they actually pay for them. Consumer
surplus is the amount above the price paid that a consumer would willingly spend, if
necessary, to consume the units purchased.”).
88. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147, 152 (2013).
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However, there are still ways to misunderstand such an agreement.
First, it is possible to mistake one side’s gain for a sacrifice by the other
side. In our car example, the dealer receives a benefit (ignoring fixed costs)
of $10,000. A simplistic view might thus assume that the buyer has taken a
loss of $10,000; after all, she paid $25,000 for something that could be
bought wholesale for $15,000. But to purchase the car for $15,000, the buyer
would need to, inter alia, establish a wholesaling relationship with a
distributor, purchase a large volume of cars on a regular basis, and wait for
delivery. Put differently, the dealer has a “comparative advantage” in
retailing cars, as it would be highly inefficient for the buyer to try to replicate
the dealer’s position in the market to save $10,000.89 Thus, when considered
from both parties’ perspectives (as it must be), this purchase of a car is not
suspicious simply because the dealer makes a profit.90
Second, a court could misunderstand the agreement by solely asking
which side received the “better” benefit. For example, does the fact that the
dealer made $10,000 gross profit while the buyer gained only $5,000 in
consumer surplus mean that the buyer “lost money?” Not at all. That the
dealer might have received greater additional value than the buyer means
only that the buyer did not “win” to the maximum extent possible by getting
the theoretical absolute minimum price; she still “won” a benefit of $5,000.
The same is true, moreover, even if this win was below some measure of
“market value” — i.e., if the market price of the used car was below $25,000
— as the buyer still valued the car at $30,000, and thus obtained a consumer
surplus regardless of whether she received the absolute best deal that she
could have received in the market.91
Finally, a word of caution. Some have described reverse payment patent
settlements as “win-win” because over the long term the patentee might
expect to more than recoup its initial sacrifice, while also benefiting the

89. See Alan Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of
International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 49, 49 (1998) (describing comparative
advantage in the context of opportunity costs, as the “engine of trade”); R. George
Wright, At What Is the Supreme Court Comparatively Advantaged, 116 W. VA. L. REV.
535, 545–46 (2013).
90. It could similarly be possible to misunderstand an agreement by focusing overly
on results rather than expectations. See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 133 F. Supp.
3d 734, 753–54 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1071
(11th Cir. 2005) (“The Commission’s finding that the ‘Upsher licenses were worth
nothing to Schering’ overlooks the very nature of the pharmaceutical industry where
licenses are very often granted on drugs that never see the market.”).
91. See also infra Part IV.A (explaining why “market value” is a poor guide in a
constrained market).
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patent challenger.92 But the contemporaneous agreement — the alleged
reverse payment — is not a win for the patentee, but rather a loss that is later
recouped. To understand this distinction, consider predatory pricing, in
which a monopolist prices below cost, taking an initial loss, which it then
expects to recoup after driving others out of the market. Though the
monopolist in such a predatory pricing scheme ultimately stands to “win”
with supracompetitive profits, the initial below-cost pricing is not a win but
a loss, because the monopolist initially loses money on each sale. Here, too,
a reverse payment is not a “win-win” contemporaneous agreement but an
initial sacrifice, and a win-win contemporaneous agreement is not a reverse
payment as it contains no such initial sacrifice and thus no loss to recoup.
Win-Neutral. To return to our hypothetical, what if the dealer — doing
a favor for the buyer, a personal friend in financial trouble — sells her the
car for $15,000, i.e., at exactly the cost the dealer paid for the car? In this
scenario, the dealer provides the buyer with $15,000 in consumer surplus
($30,000 minus the $15,000 the buyer paid), but the dealer earns no profit.
Such a transaction is not too hard to imagine, particularly because the
buyer otherwise could not have purchased a car from the dealer. The social
benefits of such a favor may be worth the minimal transaction costs
associated with the dealer sourcing and selling the car. While the dealer
might in some sense be said to have “lost” $10,000 in potential profit, this
profit is illusory; the buyer could not and thus would not have paid $25,000,
because she was in financial trouble. And we assume the dealer will have
no trouble procuring another car to sell to the next customer at $25,000.93
Thus, this is a win-neutral agreement, in which one side is able to do
something for the other side at little or no cost to itself.94
Such agreements may be less common than the extremely common winwin agreements discussed above, but they are likewise not hard to
understand. Indeed, as discussed above, if a patentee can achieve a favorable
settlement by providing a benefit to the patent challenger at no cost to itself,
it would make perfect sense for it to enter that agreement, regardless of the
size of the benefit to the patent challenger and regardless of the strength of

92. See, e.g., Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154 (“The patentee and the challenger gain; the
consumer loses.”); FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012)
(describing a reverse payment settlement as a “win-win” because the brand maintains its
patent and the patent challenger receives more settlement money than it would earn in
profits even if it won the patent litigation).
93. But see infra Part IV.A (discussing the implications when this assumption is not
correct, and why the antitrust laws would nonetheless reach the same results).
94. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO: NEGOTIATING IN DIFFICULT SITUATIONS 118
(1991) (“The most common way to expand the pie is to . . . [i]dentify items you could
give the other side that are of high benefit to them but low cost to you.”).
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the patent.95 Such no-cost agreements, like a win-win agreement, are Pareto
superior; they make at least one party better off and none worse off, and thus
can be expected to rationally occur.96
Win-Lose. Finally, what if our buyer paid $10,000 for a toy car instead?
Unless there was some other explanation, such an agreement would seem
“unusual,”97 as the dealer would receive roughly $10,000 in profit and the
buyer would only receive a toy.98 Such an arrangement, if not explained,
may raise questions. This sort of irrational “sacrifice,” where one party
appears to take an inexplicable loss in absolute terms, was allegedly at issue
in Actavis.99 And if entered as part of a patent settlement, such an
arrangement could in theory constitute a reverse payment (though perhaps
not a “large” one given the dollar figures in our hypothetical).
The astute reader will notice something that this type of win-lose
agreement has in common with the win-win agreement discussed above:
they both benefit the dealer, and indeed in our hypothetical do so to the exact
same extent ($10,000). By looking at these two very different agreements
solely from the perspective of the dealer, we might mistakenly think that they
are the same — that because in each case the dealer walks away with a
$10,000 profit, a win-win and a win-lose transaction are equally suspicious.
Yet the two agreements otherwise have little in common when viewed in
totality; we might realistically ask why anyone would ever pay $10,000 for
a toy car, but it takes no great understanding of economics to see why
someone might pay $25,000 for what she sees as a $30,000 car.
A court therefore cannot infer that if a patent challenger received a benefit,
the patentee must have taken a loss. A benefit to the patent challenger is
necessary, not sufficient, to show a reverse payment.100 Rather, a reverse
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See supra Part III.B.ii.c.
See Calabresi, supra note 85, at 1215 (describing Pareto superiority).
See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (noting reverse payment settlements are “unusual”).
See id.
Appearances can of course be deceiving; perhaps the toy car is the last piece in
the very rich buyer’s 30-year collection project, and one of a kind, such that the buyer
expects to receive far more than $10,000 in value from owning it. Sure, $10,000 for such
a toy might seem excessive, but, then, people have paid far more than that (over $5
million in fact) for cardboard pictures of baseball players. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 132 (8th ed. 2013) (“Because different
consumers place different values on the consumption of particular goods, the maximum
amount they are willing to pay for those goods also differs.”). An initial suspicion about
the agreement thus should not be permitted to become an irrebuttable presumption of
wrongdoing.
100. Nor can a benefit to the patent challenger constitute a suspect reverse payment
simply because the challenger received more from the contemporaneous agreements than
it stood to gain by winning the patent case, as at least one court has incorrectly held.
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payment under Actavis must be both a sacrifice by the patentee and a benefit
to the patent challenger.
A Reverse Payment Must Be Large Enough to Suggest
Patent Weakness
That a reverse payment must be a patentee sacrifice also helps define the
meaning of the term “large” in Actavis.101 Simply put, a large payment must
be one that is large enough to provide the “workable surrogate for a patent’s
weakness” Actavis demands, by providing meaningful insight into the
patentee’s views of the strength or weakness of the patent.102 For example,
if a patentee were found to have made a $1 million payment above fair value
and saved litigation costs in connection with a settlement of a $10 billion a
year product, that $1 million would represent roughly 52 minutes worth of
sales.103 While $1 million is maybe a lot of money to you or me, such a
payment simply would not be large enough to suggest that the patent was
weak; a $1 million payment is more or less a rounding error in that
settlement, and thus tells us little to nothing about how the patentee viewed
the strength or weakness of its patent. “Large” within the meaning of Actavis
therefore must mean a sacrifice by the patentee that would be seen as large
within the context of the overall value of the patent.

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 402, 417 (E.D. Pa.
2015) (concluding, based on a single sentence in Actavis, that the relevant test is “what
would induce the generic to stay off of the market”); see also Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154
(noting that a patentee could “sometimes pay a generic challenger a sum even larger than
what the generic would gain in profits if it won the paragraph IV litigation and entered
the market”). While Cephalon also cited Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 12, for this
proposition, that article says only that the potential for a patent challenger to receive more
via a reverse payment than it stands to win in the patent case is reason to suspect that
potentially-anticompetitive reverse payment settlements might occur, not that the patent
challenger’s benefit can suffice to establish such a payment. And simply put, there is no
mechanism to use such a benefit to the patent challenger — no matter how large — to
infer patent weakness if the patentee did not concurrently make a sacrifice that might
permit such an inference. See supra Part III.B.ii.b–c.
101. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158 (“[A] reverse payment, where large and unjustified,
can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects . . . .”); id. (“[T]he size of
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the
validity of the patent itself.”); see also, e.g., Cephalon, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 416
(“Actavis did not identify any specific formula for determining whether a reverse
payment is sufficiently large.”).
102. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158; see also Gant, supra note 49, at 144–46 (analyzing this
question further from an integrative bargaining perspective). As discussed infra Parts
IV and VI, such a payment must also remain large after subtracting saved litigation costs
and fair value, as neither represents a “sacrifice” by the patentee.
103. $1 million is 0.01% of $10 billion, and 52 minutes is 0.01% of a year.
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IV. “FAIR VALUE” IS THE ABSENCE OF A PATENTEE SACRIFICE IN
ABSOLUTE TERMS, AND IS NOT DEFINED BY “MARKET VALUE” OR BY THE
“REASONS” FOR THE AGREEMENT
We therefore have established that a reverse payment is, first and
foremost, a patentee sacrifice. But simply knowing that there must be a
patentee sacrifice is not quite enough to fully understand Actavis; we must
also understand what it means to make a sacrifice. Or, more precisely, a
sacrifice relative to what. To understand this point, we turn to the question
of “fair value” in Actavis, though again we find the definition not in Actavis
itself, but rather in Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, Trinko, and their progeny.
Actavis holds that value provided by the patentee to the patent challenger
in connection with a patent settlement is not suspect under the antitrust laws
if that value was merely “fair value for services.”104 But why not? Here, too,
the sacrifice and recoupment framework answers the question. “Fair value”
under Actavis surely means the lack of a patentee sacrifice, as when a
patentee receives fair value from a business arrangement entered in
connection with settlement it has not made the sacrifice necessary to infer
patent weakness or anticompetitive effect.
But what does it mean for a patentee not to have made a “sacrifice?”
While that sounds like a very straightforward question — and, as we
conclude below, it has a very straightforward answer — there are at least
three potential answers that have been proposed in reverse payment cases:
(1) Fair value in Actavis should be read to mean “market value,”
such that a contemporaneous agreement must provide the patentee
the same value as an ideal agreement reached on the open market
or else the patentee has made a sacrifice relative to what it might
have gained from a different, “market value” transaction105
(discussed in Part IV.A below);
(2) A contemporaneous agreement should be considered fair value
only if the “basic reason” the parties entered the agreement was to
compensate the patent challenger for goods and services rather than
to settle, such that the value provided under the agreement was
effectively unrelated to the settlement106 (discussed in Part IV.B
below); or
104. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156.
105. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 263–

64 (D. Mass. 2014) (addressing fair market value); Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference,
supra note 49, at 594 (suggesting that parties must obtain the same value through patent
settlements as they would have been able to obtain in the market through “arms-length,
stand-alone” transactions).
106. See, e.g., Complaint Counsel’s Appeal of the Initial Decision at 33–34, In re
Impax Labs., Inc. (F.T.C. July 10, 2018) (No. 9373) [hereinafter Impax Labs Complaint]
(advocating this test).
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(3) Fair value is the absence of a patentee sacrifice in absolute
terms, meaning that so long as a patentee at least breaks even (a
“win-neutral” deal) there can be no reverse payment (discussed in
Part IV.C below).
As shown below, only the third option is consistent with the term “fair
value,” the Court’s guidance in Actavis, and established antitrust principles,
and thus, fair value must mean the absence of a patentee sacrifice in absolute
terms, just as in Brooke Group and Trinko.
Failure to Achieve Market Value Cannot Support the Actavis
Inference of Patent Weakness, Market Power, and the Potential for
Anticompetitive Effects
We will start with the wrong answer — that the Supreme Court’s use of
the term “fair value” in Actavis must actually be a misprint, as the Supreme
Court must surely have meant “market value.”107 As shown below, such a
conclusion is at odds with the normal legal meaning of the term “fair value,”
because it asks courts to compare a settlement to illusory hypotheticals.
Furthermore, it rejects the Supreme Court’s guidance in cases like Brooke
Group and Trinko by replacing a “sacrifice” in the Court’s jurisprudence
with a mere failure to profit maximize.
Actavis Addressed “Fair Value” Because Settlements Rarely
Involve the Exchange of “Market Value”
Although the legal definition of the terms “fair value” and “market value”
may overlap, they focus on entirely distinct questions.108 As discussed
107. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (noting that fair value is the standard).
108. See, e.g., Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 876, 888 (E.D. Mo. 1999)

(comparing the differing analyses of fair value and market value, noting that in the fair
value analysis there is no market; therefore, “[t]here is no implication that both parties
have entered the market place, or that all of the parties are equally well-informed of the
circumstances involved in the transaction . . . .” and “one of the parties lacks the ability
to back out or withdraw from the transaction”); Calais Co. v. Ivy, 303 P.3d 410, 418 n.24
(Alaska 2013) (citing UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE
112–13 (2000)) (rejecting the view that “fair value, market value, and fair market value
are ‘virtually synonymous’” because these values will rarely be the same); see also Balt.
& Ohio R.R. v. United States, 305 U.S. 507, 524 (1939) (noting that market value is just
one way to determine fair value); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 579 (1929) (stating
“fair value” can be ascertained by means other than market value); DH2, Inc. v. SEC,
422 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.2a-4(a)(1), (c))
(distinguishing fair value and market value); Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63
P.3d 353, 361–63 (Colo. 2003) (noting “fair value does not mean fair market value” but
instead “the shareholder’s proportionate ownership interest in the value of the
corporation”); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 212 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)) (“[E]xcept in a
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below, an agreement is fair value if the particular individuals involved in a
transaction obtained something economically reasonable under their
circumstances and in light of the constraints they faced.109 By contrast,
“market value” (or, confusingly, “fair market value”110) is “the price that
would be agreed on between a willing buyer and a willing seller, with neither
being required to act, and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
facts.”111 Thus unlike a fair value standard, which looks to the actual parties
and the actual prices that would have been fair for those parties to pay under
the actual circumstances, market value asks what price would have been paid
few jurisdictions . . . , ‘fair value’ does not mean ‘fair market value.’ Market value is, at
most, one factor in determining fair value.”); INT’L VALUATION STANDARDS COMM.,
EXPOSURE DRAFT OF PROPOSED REVISED INTERNATIONAL VALUATION STANDARD 2 —
BASES OTHER THAN MARKET VALUE § 6.4 (2006), https://web.archive.org/web/
20070621040820/http://www.ivsc.org/pubs/exp_drafts/ivs2.pdf (distinguishing “fair
value” and “market value” by determining whether “the price is fair between two specific
parties” by evaluating “the respective advantages or disadvantage that each will gain
from the transaction” and acknowledging that while “[m]arket value” may meet these
criteria, this is not necessarily always the case”). But see Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v.
Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 669–70 (1912) (noting fair value is sometimes an
appropriate measure for market value); Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d 745,
749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[N]one of the cases suggests that fair value can never be
equated to fair market value.”).
109. See infra Part IV.C.; Bank One Corp. v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 174, 308–09 (2003),
aff’d in relevant part, sub nom. JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Comm’r, 458 F.3d 564 (7th
Cir. 2006) (stating fair value focuses on actual persons, while fair market value focuses
on hypothetical persons with full information in an open market); see also INT’L
VALUATION STANDARDS COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL VALUATION STANDARDS 2013:
FRAMEWORK AND REQUIREMENTS ¶¶ 38, 40–41 (2013), http://www.valuers
institute.com.au/docs/professional_practice/International%20Valuation%20Standards%
202013.pdf (“Fair value is the estimated price for the transfer of an asset or liability
between identified knowledgeable and willing parties that reflects the respective interests
of those parties. [] [F]air value can be distinguished from market value. Fair value
requires the assessment of the price that is fair between two identified parties taking into
account the respective advantages or disadvantages that each will gain from the
transaction. It is commonly applied in judicial contexts. In contrast, market value
requires any advantages that would not be available to market participants generally to
be disregarded. Fair value is a broader concept than market value.”). Fair value is often
used where assets are thinly traded, as there will not often be a “market” in which to
crystalize value. Compare id. ¶¶ 41–42 (discussing fair value), with id. ¶¶ 29–34
(discussing market value).
110. See Value, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining fair market
value).
111. I.R.S. Publication 561 (02/2020), Determining the Value of Donated Property
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p561; see also, e.g., INT’L VALUATION
STANDARDS COUNCIL, IVS 104 BASES OF VALUE 18, ¶ 30.1 (2017), http://www.cas.or
g.cn/docs/2017-01/20170120142445588690.pdf (“[T]he estimated amount for which an
asset or liability should exchange on the valuation date between a willing buyer and a
willing seller in an arm’s length transaction, after proper marketing and where the parties
had each acted knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion.”).
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in a hypothetical unconstrained market by hypothetical unconstrained buyers
and sellers who can freely walk away.112
Parties settling disputes are, generally speaking, not unconstrained buyers
and sellers who can freely walk away, but rather constrained to prefer
agreement over non-agreement. It therefore should not be expected that such
parties would enter market value agreements.113 For example, imagine that
the car dealer and the buyer in our hypothetical above are now locked in
litigation over $7,000 in claimed damages that the buyer is seeking from the
dealer. To settle, the buyer offers to purchase another car for $18,000 rather
than the usual market price of $25,000. As before, the dealer paid $15,000
for the car, and can purchase another car for that price, so while it will see
its profits reduced relative to the theoretical market price, it will earn $3,000
it would otherwise not receive (as the buyer otherwise would not buy, much
less at full price). A settlement and a gain of $3,000 (or even $0) is of course
better than no settlement in that situation — it is “fair value,” even if not
“market value.” Entering such a settlement — while perhaps in some sense
a “sacrifice” relative to the “market value” — not only would not be
irrational for the dealer, but in fact would perhaps be the only economically
rational course of action.114
By contrast, applying a “market value” standard to the settlement of
litigation would ask settling parties to do something that would often be
completely irrational: Refuse to settle unless by settling the parties obtain
as much value as they might obtain by dealing at arm’s length in an
unconstrained market outside litigation. In our hypothetical, for example,
the dealer would be forced to continue litigating, risking a loss of $7,000,
simply because a gain of $3,000 to settle was somehow deemed insufficient
as compared to a hypothetical market value transaction that it hypothetically
could have entered — and indeed would be forced to do so even though in
practice no such hypothetical market value transaction was available.115
Likewise, under Actavis the decision to settle for fair value but for less
than market value cannot serve as a “workable surrogate for a patent’s
weakness,” and cannot be the type of reverse payment that would support an
112. See I.R.S. Publication 561, supra note 111; INT’L VALUATION STANDARDS
COUNSEL, supra note 111, at 18–19, ¶¶ 30.1, 30.2.
113. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 81 (1991) (“In labor
disputes, as in other kinds of litigation, even a bad settlement may be more advantageous
in the long run than a good lawsuit.”); see also infra note 147 (collecting cases).
114. See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not
Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2009) (noting the effect potential litigation
can have in shaping settlements).
115. See also Gant, supra note 49, at 139–40 (rejecting the “outside litigation” test
requiring settling parties to enter only agreements identical to what the parties might have
reached outside of the litigation context).
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inference of potential anticompetitive effects.116 Simply put, a patentee
would accept a gain and a settlement on acceptable terms regardless of the
patent’s merits, as a gain and a settlement beats no gain and no settlement,
regardless of whether the patent is strong or weak. Actavis therefore does
not look to a sacrifice relative to “market value.”
Actavis Does Not Apply a Market Value Standard Even Where
There Is a Foregone Alternative
But before proceeding, we should consider the “hard” case here. What if
the car dealer in the above hypothetical was only able to procure one car of
this type, for which there was significant demand, such that by selling to the
buyer at $18,000 the dealer was foregoing another sale at $25,000 that it will
not be able to recover? In this situation, some scholars have suggested that
“fair value” for antitrust purposes would be the foregone market value of the
alternative deal, presumably because they believe it would not be
economically reasonable to enter into a settlement when doing so
“sacrificed” the opportunity for a more profitable alternative.117 However,
this conclusion is incorrect for two independent reasons.
Market Value Alternatives Are Often Illusory
First, in practice such “alternatives” are often entirely illusory, particularly
in the pharmaceuticals context in which Actavis cases most often arise. As
the Supreme Court has noted, “[f]irms do not expand without limit and none
of them enters every market that an outside observer might regard as
profitable, or even a small portion of such markets.”118
Indeed, the same literature suggesting that courts adopt a market value test
also makes clear that patentees and patent challengers in the pharmaceutical
industry (where most reverse payment cases arise) rarely actually enter
alternative deals outside of settlement.119 What these sources incorrectly see
as suspect — the fact that parties in litigation might “get creative” to find
ways to work together profitably so that they can settle and exit that
litigation, even if that means doing business together in a way they usually
would not — is therefore also reason to reject the assumption that absent the
settlement they would have entered some other, better hypothetical deal.
116. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).
117. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 49, at 594.
118. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007) (quoting PHILLIP E.

AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 155, ¶ 307d (Supp. 2006)).
119. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data
and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (2009)
(noting that agreements reached as part of patent settlements are rarely reached outside
of settlement and arguing that this should be a concern).

268

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:2

Most likely, they would not have done so, and any foregone “market value”
alternative is almost always illusory.
Moreover, even if the parties were to routinely enter alternative
agreements, it is rare that entering development or similar deals is a zerosum game, such that doing a deal with one party precludes also doing a
separate deal with another party at market value. Although there may
sometimes be unique cars that the dealer cannot replace with another, in most
cases the dealer actually can buy another car to sell at full price. There is
thus no valid basis on which to set a “market value” for most agreements
entered alongside settlement, and a market value alternative is thus typically
illusory.120
Failure to Profit Maximize Is Not a “Sacrifice” Under the
Antitrust Laws
But the “market value alternative” approach is in error even in the rare
case in which alternatives are not illusory. To show why, once again turn
back to Brooke Group, in which the Court held that above-cost pricing is not
a sacrifice regardless of whether higher prices might have been more
profitable.121 Plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases have long sought to argue
that “above-cost” in Brooke Group should be redefined to include the
“opportunity cost” of pricing below market value, such that if an alleged
monopolist prices below “market value,” it thus prices “below cost.”122
Courts consistently reject this approach of requiring monopolists to profit
maximize, however, and reiterate that Brooke Group instead requires a
sacrifice in absolute terms — below cost pricing, not below-market
pricing.123
120. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 482–83 (2002)
(discussing how “value” is particularly hard to measure where “costly facilities rarely
changed hands and so were seldom tagged with a price a buyer would actually pay and
a seller accept”). See generally ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION:
SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE FINANCE 497–540 (2d ed. 2006)
(noting the same determination). This is not to say, however, that, if forced to apply a
market value analysis instead of Actavis’s fair value analysis, a defendant would be
without all recourse. Although it will be rare that any actual alternative agreement will
have been foregone in connection with a patent settlement, it is nonetheless sometimes
possible to find a market value comparator by looking at other agreements at other times
under other circumstances. But there is simply no requirement under Actavis to do so.
121. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24
(1993).
122. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113–14, 1116–17 (10th Cir.
2003).
123. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)
(quoting In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 459 F. Supp. 626, 631 (N.D.
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One reason for this rule, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed,
is simply that courts should not be in the business of requiring parties to make
what the court considers the “best” deal (an inquiry for which courts are
poorly suited at best), but rather may only look for irrational agreements that
involve a true sacrifice by the alleged monopolist.124 Trinko thus rejects the
idea of courts “act[ing] as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing — a role for which they are ill-suited,”
and thus the idea of a court deciding which of a company’s various options
was the “right” one.125 In the Actavis context, a court second-guessing a
Cal. 1978)) (“The measure of marginal cost proposed by Rebel is thus really the
opportunity cost to ARCO of choosing to enter into the exchange agreement rather than
selling the crude oil elsewhere. Opportunity costs are vastly different from ARCO’s
marginal or variable costs, and we agree that ‘the use of the concept of opportunity costs
[to show predatory pricing] must be held improper as a matter of law.’”); AMR Corp.,
335 F.3d at 1118–19 (rejecting the test that “effectively treats foregone or ‘sacrificed’
profits as costs, and condemns activity that may have been profitable as predatory”);
Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 701 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(expressing that opportunity cost is not a cost of implementing a particular business
choice, and cannot be included in considering average variable price); see also Gant,
supra note 49, at 141–42 (noting this point in passing).
124. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408–10, 415–16 (2004) (stating antitrust laws do not “give judges carte blanche to
insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other approach
might yield greater competition”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074–
75 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining risk of substituting judicial insight for business judgment
by stating “to the extent that Aspen’s test still might be accused of being underinclusive
to some degree even in the narrow field of refusals to deal, the general rule is firm
independence and refusal to deal doctrine exists only to address one of the most obvious
exceptions to that general rule. If the doctrine fails to capture every nuance, if it must
err still to some slight degree, perhaps it is better that it should err on the side of firm
independence — given its demonstrated value to the competitive process and consumer
welfare — than on the other side where we face the risk of inducing collusion and inviting
judicial central planning.”); In re United Artists Theatre Co., 315 F.3d 217, 231 (3d Cir.
2003) (“The art of governing [a company] (it is emphatically not a science) is replete
with judgment calls and ‘bet the company’ decisions that in retrospect may seem
visionary or deranged, depending on the outcome.”); Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 229.
125. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408. Indeed, there is typically no “right answer” to a patent
dispute, and thus no “right settlement” that the parties should have entered. See Gant,
supra note 49, at 127 (explaining why there is no right answer to patent litigation); Joshua
P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney’s Fees
by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65, 122 (1996)
(rejecting idea of a “right answer to a dispute”); see also King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc.
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 409 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Actavis does not stand
for the proposition that parties must reach the most procompetitive settlements
possible.”); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 864 n.10 (Cal. 2015) (“There is no
statutory right to have parties enter the agreement most favorable to competition, only a
prohibition against entering agreements that harm competition.”); Buffalo Broad. Co. v.
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 933 (2d Cir. 1984); Am.
Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating businesses
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“below market” settlement would similarly be asked to determine which of
a range of possible business agreements the patentee “should” have preferred
over that agreement — something courts are ill-equipped to do, particularly
in a field as complex as the pharmaceutical industry.126
To understand the danger of such second-guessing, imagine that in our
original used car hypothetical, there is a dealer next door that is willing to
sell a roughly equivalent used car for $24,000 rather than the $25,000 our
dealer was offering, but that our buyer nonetheless purchases a car from our
original dealer for $25,000. Is the buyer’s purchase of the car thus irrational?
The answer is far more complicated than might be imagined. First, the two
cars are not identical — even if the same make, model, and year, and even if
we imagine that they have the exact same mileage and are in the exact same
condition — as one is priced higher than the other, which may lead buyers
to assume that it is of higher quality.127 Moreover, the dealers are different,
presumably employing different salespeople of differing persuasiveness,
have different service departments, etc. And how these differences impact
the buyer will be very much a matter of personal preference. The buyer may
thus view the higher-priced car as providing sufficient value to more than
offset any difference in price, even if the two cars are virtually identical.
Finally, we should not assume that the buyer has conducted exhaustive
market research before deciding to buy a car; the buyer may simply not know
that there is a cheaper option next door, and merely making a bad or ill-

are not “guarantors that the imaginations of lawyers could not conjure up some method
of achieving the business purpose in question which would result in a somewhat lesser
restriction of trade”).
126. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408; Novell, 731 F.3d at 1074–75 (explaining
importance of prior profitable course of dealing to distinguish unlawful conduct); Covad,
Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting the same);
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[H]ow is a judge or jury
to determine a ‘fair price?’ Is it the price charged by other suppliers of the primary
product? None exist. Is it the price that competition ‘would have set’ were the primary
level not monopolized? How can the court determine this price without examining costs
and demands, indeed without acting like a rate-setting regulatory agency, the rate-setting
proceedings of which often last for several years? Further, how is the court to decide the
proper size of the price ‘gap?’ Must it be large enough for all independent competing
firms to make a ‘living profit,’ no matter how inefficient they may be? If not, how does
one identify the ‘inefficient’ firms? And how should the court respond when costs or
demands change over time, as they inevitably will? We do not say that these questions
are unanswerable, but we have said enough to show why antitrust courts normally avoid
direct price administration, relying on rules and remedies (such as structural remedies,
e.g., prohibiting certain vertical mergers) that are easier to administer.”).
127. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2011)
(collecting authority that consumers tend to view higher-priced items as superior).

2021

"SACRIFICE AND RECOUPMENT"

271

informed business decision is not typically an antitrust violation.128
Thus, even when dealing with something as simple as a used car, for which
there is an identifiable market, the idea that the buyer “should” have
purchased the cheaper option, and that not purchasing the cheaper option is
thus somehow suspicious, may well be mistaken. And of course, this is a
greatly simplified example; courts trying to decide which agreement a
pharmaceutical company should have preferred — a much more complicated
inquiry — face an even harder task, which courts are not typically equipped
to decide, and which they should thus approach very cautiously at best. A
court therefore cannot replace the “sacrifice” in Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing,
and Trinko with a failure to profit maximize at “market value.”
Aspen Skiing Involved a True Sacrifice, and Does Not Require
Companies to Profit Maximize
Finally, Aspen Skiing is not to the contrary, and in fact illustrates the rule
adopted in Brooke Group and Trinko. In Aspen Skiing, a case Trinko called
“at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability,”129 the alleged monopolist
forfeited actual and concrete profits by discontinuing an existing profitable
deal with a rival, and the Supreme Court held that such a sacrifice could raise
potential antitrust concerns.130 But Aspen Skiing would surely have been
decided differently if there had been a limited number of tickets that could
be sold each day, and greater demand for the tickets than supply, such that
by selling a ticket to its competitor the alleged monopolist would be denied
a chance to sell that same ticket to its own customers — and, indeed, forced
to instead direct its customers to its rival to purchase the tickets.131 Given a
choice between two mutually-exclusive sales, even a monopolist may choose
to supply its own customers rather than a rival, and may presumably do so
even if the competitor were to offer a higher price than the monopolist’s
customers, such that preferring its own customers might appear “irrational”
128. See FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (rejecting
allegations by the FTC because “[t]his is not a situation where the FTC has alleged that
[the patentee] agreed to sell [a product] to [the generic] for less than its cost,” and
refusing to “go forward on the basis of the existence of a reverse payment simply because
the FTC believes [the patentee] signed a bad deal for itself and a good deal for [the
generic]”); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 809 (6th Cir.
1988) (stating “antitrust liability cannot be premised on improvident business
decisions.”).
129. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
130. See id. at 408–09.
131. See id. at 408–09, 415–16; see also, e.g., RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Alcon Labs.,
Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 218, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 391 Fed. App’x 59 (2d Cir. 2010)
(noting no obligation to enter into an agreement with plaintiff rather than other
distributors).
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(i.e., offer less immediate profit) on a market value basis.132
Actavis, therefore, does not require that a patentee and patent challenger
agree to the best possible or “market” rate, as failure to do so simply does
not suggest the irrationality of a true patentee sacrifice and thus cannot serve
as a workable surrogate for patent weakness. Actavis used the term “fair
value” rather than “market value” for a reason, and that reason is that failure
to realize market value is not a workable surrogate for patent weakness or
anticompetitive effect as the Actavis inference would require. Many
patentees would prefer a profit and a settlement over no profit and no
settlement, even when the profit is not the ideal gain that they might have
enjoyed in a market value transaction, and there is nothing remotely
irrational about such a choice. “Fair value” under Actavis therefore should
not be rewritten to mean the legally distinct concept of “market value.”
Courts Must Reject the FTC’s “Basic Reason” Test, Which Confuses
Intent to Settle with Intent to Delay and Would Bar Virtually All
Contemporaneous Agreements
For the same reasons, and more, courts should also reject the “basic
reason” test now advocated by the FTC, effectively as a substitute or
replacement for the “fair value” test the Supreme Court offered.133
In Actavis, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]f the basic reason” for a
reverse payment “is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated
monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other justification, the
antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.”134 The FTC has since
interpreted this passage to mean that a contemporaneous deal to a patent
settlement is not “fair value” unless its “basic reason” is to compensate for
goods or services, rather than to “induce the generic challenger to abandon
its claim” — in other words, unless the reason for the contemporaneous
agreement has effectively nothing to do with the parties’ decision to settle.135
But this “basic reason” test for determining fair value is flawed, perverse,
and misunderstands the instructions of Actavis.
First, by merging the question of whether there was a reverse payment
with the question of the parties’ intent, the FTC forgets to look for the
potentially-anticompetitive conduct Actavis requires. The antitrust laws do
not condemn thought crimes, and the Supreme Court has long held that intent
132. See, e.g., Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 146 F.
Supp. 3d 1217, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (stating there was no duty to supply a rival when
monopolist wished to reserve supply to sell itself and did not have excess capacity).
133. See, e.g., Impax Labs Complaint, supra note 106, at 33–34 (advocating this test).
134. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).
135. See, e.g., Impax Labs Complaint, supra note 106, at 33–34 (quoting Actavis, 570
U.S. at 154).
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cannot transform proper conduct into improper conduct but rather only helps
interpret the competitive effects of said conduct.136
The FTC’s error here can be understood by once again considering Trinko
and Aspen Skiing. Trinko noted that in Aspen Skiing the cancellation of a
prior profitable course of dealing suggested that the monopolist had a
“distinctly anticompetitive bent.”137 This conclusion helped the Court
interpret potentially-ambiguous conduct such as the refusal to deal with a
rival. The Court did not suggest, however, that a distinctly anticompetitive
bent could be used to infer the cancellation of a prior profitable course of
dealing. Intent must follow conduct, rather than conduct following intent.
Any proper inquiry under Actavis must therefore begin by asking whether
there was a suspect reverse payment, i.e., the type of conduct that Actavis
held could suggest the potential for anticompetitive effects.138 This is why
the “basic reason” language in Actavis appears near the end of the decision,
as only after the Court establishes that there was allegedly a large,
unexplained reverse payment does it then ask the question on which the FTC
focuses: What was the basic reason for that payment, i.e., what was the intent
of the conduct?139 If an agreement was instead fair value — i.e., involved no
reverse payment — there was no such conduct from which to infer any
136. See supra Part II.B; Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (noting intent may be relevant “not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may
help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences”); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 n.10 (2010) (stating the same); Joshua P. Davis &
Ryan J. McEwan, Deactivating Actavis: The Clash Between the Supreme Court and
(Some) Lower Courts, 67 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 557, 580–81 n.132 (2015) (minimizing
intent’s role in the Actavis analysis); Michael A. Carrier, How Not to Apply Actavis, 109
NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 113, 122 (2015) (“Actavis did not add an intent requirement
into rule-of-reason analysis.”). A well-functioning market can be full of malicious,
mean-spirited, aggressive competition — and intent to harm rivals is not anticompetitive.
See Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1184 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225
(1993)) (“Competitors are not required to engage in a lovefest; indeed, ‘[e]ven an act of
pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a
claim under the federal antitrust laws.’”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064,
1078 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining if “intent to harm a competitor alone [was] the marker
of antitrust liability, the law would risk retarding consumer welfare by deterring vigorous
competition”); Olympia Equip. Leasing v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th
Cir. 1986) (“[I]f conduct is not objectively anticompetitive the fact that it was motivated
by hostility to competitors . . . is irrelevant.”).
137. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004).
138. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156 (discussing fair value).
139. See id. at 158 (emphasis added) (“Although the parties may have reasons to
prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What
are those reasons?”).
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potentially-anticompetitive intent. By starting with intent rather than
conduct, the FTC effectively condemns all settlements where it deduces
some anticompetitive “intent” in the agreement — an absurd and improper
result.
Second, the FTC’s proposed “basic reason” test would effectively outlaw
all settlements involving contemporaneous agreements, and would do so for
the purported crime of making it possible for the parties to settle. Under the
FTC’s test, even fair value agreements containing no patentee sacrifice could
be condemned if the parties’ “intent” was to “induce the generic challenger
to abandon its claim.”140 “Induce the generic to abandon its claim” is just
another way of saying “offer sufficiently attractive terms to allow the parties
to reach a settlement.” All settlements do so; inducing the other side to stop
litigating is the point of settlement!
Actavis did not seek to outlaw all such settlements; on the contrary, the
Supreme Court went to great lengths to explain that inducing settlements will
often be appropriate, including agreements that incorporate “fair value”
deals.141 Instead, the passage of Actavis on which the FTC relies makes clear
that it is not “inducing settlement” that is a problem, but rather inducing
settlement using a reverse payment — i.e., if a patentee “seeks to induce the
generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits
that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market.”142 The FTC,
therefore, cannot use the first clause in this sentence in Actavis to condemn
all patent settlements with contemporaneous agreements on the basis that
they “induce” settlement — it must look to the whole sentence.143
Fair value under Actavis thus cannot mean that the patentee’s “basic
reason” for the agreement must have been entirely independent of any desire
to “induce” the patent challenger to abandon its claims — i.e., to settle.
Rather than a test for “fair value,” the “basic reason” language in Actavis
serves the same role as the “anticompetitive bent” in Trinko, and thus comes
into play only after suspect conduct has been shown.144
Fair Value in Absolute Terms Is Instead the Right Standard under
Actavis, Brooke Group, and Trinko
Instead, the Supreme Court adopted a “fair value” standard. Under the
normal legal definition, an agreement is fair value if the particular
140. See, e.g., Impax Labs Complaint, supra note 106, at 33–34.
141. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 155–58 (explaining the various types of settlements that

would ultimately not raise concerns under the antitrust laws).
142. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
143. See id. at 158–59 (rejecting such an approach).
144. See supra Part II.B (explaining how intent in Trinko explained the conduct).
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individuals involved in a transaction obtained something economically
reasonable under their circumstances and in light of the constraints they
faced.145 Thus, for example, courts in the securities context have made clear
that “fair value” is the amount necessary to compensate a shareholder,
regardless of whether it is the same amount that their shares might trade for
on an open market.146 This definition is consistent with the requirement of a
sacrifice in Actavis. A party that receives something economically
reasonable under the circumstances, after all, has not taken the irrational step
needed to serve as a workable surrogate for potential patent weakness; it has
not made a sacrifice that it will need to recoup through exercise of a
monopoly. Instead, it has simply received fair value.
The conclusion that courts should consider fair value using its ordinary
definition is also consistent with the approach courts take when they are
themselves asked to approve settlements. Rather than demanding that any
settlement be “market value,” when courts are asked to approve a settlement
they ask simply whether it is better than the alternative of litigation.147 If so,
145. See supra notes 108–11.
146. See, e.g., Cox Enters. v. News-Journal Corp., 510 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.

2007) (“This is not to say that ‘fair value’ is synonymous with ‘fair market value.’ Most
courts have rejected the notion of such synonymity.”); Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243
F.3d 486, 492–93 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing and quoting Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of
Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 459 (1982)) (rejecting the idea that “fair
value” is “equivalent to ‘fair market value’” because fair market value attempts to reflect
“the context of a hypothetical sale between a willing seller and buyer, a situation that
does not exist in the dissenting shareholder situation”); Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn
Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in
Closely Held Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1173, 1186 (1996) (emphasis
added) (“‘Fair value’ is not the same as, or short-hand for, ‘fair market value.’ ‘Fair
value’ carries with it the statutory purpose that shareholders be fairly compensated,
which may or may not equate with the market’s judgment about the stock’s value.”); see
also New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 487–88 (1970) (assessing the value of
stock based on inherent value rather than merely the market value); Merion Cap. L.P. v.
Lender Processing Servs., C.A. No. 9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, at *37 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (quoting Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc., No. 19598, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 53, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005)) (“The concept of fair value under Delaware
law is not equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value.”).
147. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 81 (1991) (“In labor
disputes, as in other kinds of litigation, even a bad settlement may be more advantageous
in the long run than a good lawsuit.”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing litigants must conduct “calculations as to whether
litigation — including the attorney’s fees it entails — represents a better investment than
compromise and settlement or simply acceding to the opposing party’s demands”);
Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 520 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (acknowledging
settlement was “better than any alternative”); Guzman v. Consumer Law Grp., P.A., No.
1:11-cv-00187-JRH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62410, at *6–7 (S.D. Ga. May 11, 2016)
(“A settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate when the interests of the class as a whole
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then it is reasonable and fair value because the settling parties acted
rationally in taking the settlement instead of continuing to litigate. And, as
illustrated above, a transaction need not be perfectly equal between the
parties or provide market value in order to be “win-win.”148
Just like in Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko, in Actavis the Court
was looking not for mere failure to profit maximize, but rather for a true
sacrifice similar to pricing below cost or terminating a prior profitable course
of dealing. Thus, a fair value contemporaneous agreement under Actavis is
any agreement in which the patentee makes no sacrifice in absolute terms,
i.e., a break-even or better arrangement. This is the only reading of fair value
that remains consistent with Actavis, and that can be consistent with the
decades of antitrust jurisprudence on which Actavis depends.
V. ONLY A PATENTEE SACRIFICE CAN SUGGEST MARKET POWER
The next question is why Actavis held that “where a reverse payment
threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely
possesses the [market] power to bring that harm about in practice.”149
Unlike a Benefit to the Patent Challenger, a Sacrifice By the
Patentee May Suggest Patentee Market Power
If a reverse payment were viewed primarily or solely from the perspective
of the patent challenger, the Supreme Court’s inference of market power
from a large, unexplained reverse payment would be a non sequitur; as the
patent challenger’s receipt of value is a poor indicator of whether the
are better served if the litigation is resolved by the settlement rather than pursued.”);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.42 (1995) (“In determining whether a
settlement should be approved, the court must decide whether it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate under the circumstances and whether the interest of the class as a whole are
better served if the litigation is resolved by the settlement rather than pursued.”); In re
Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (quoting
In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2000)) (“The
Court is ‘not called upon to determine whether the settlement reached by the parties is
the best possible deal, nor whether class members will receive as much from a settlement
as they might have recovered from victory at trial.’”).
148. Cf. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 454 (2009)
(noting impossibility of court determining “fair” or “proper” profit from an agreement).
The district court in Cephalon thus improperly relied on the suggestion that it mattered
whether the patent challenger received “a much larger percentage of the projected value”
than the brand. King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 402, 416
(E.D. Pa. 2015). The correct analysis is not whether the parties received equal value —
a perfect 50/50 split — but rather whether the patentee made a large sacrifice relative to
the alternative of not entering the agreement. See supra Part III.B.ii.c (explaining how a
“win-win” agreement could be mistaken for a “win-lose” agreement by comparing the
two parties’ “wins”).
149. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 157 (2013).

2021

"SACRIFICE AND RECOUPMENT"

277

patentee has market power. There are likely very few people or companies
in this world whose response to an offered benefit would be to inquire as to
whether the offeror has market power. Why should they care?
Instead, a large, unexplained reverse payment suggests market power
because a patentee “without [market] power is [un]likely to pay ‘large sums’
to induce ‘others to stay out of its market,’”150 and thus that a patentee is
willing to make a large, unexplained sacrifice may in some cases suggest that
it also has the market power to recoup that sacrifice.151 Once again, it is the
patentee sacrifice and recoupment that matters, as it is only this that makes
sense of the inference Actavis draws.
Inferences Are Not Enough; Market Power Must Ultimately Be
Proven By the Plaintiff
This also makes clear, however, that any assumption of market power
under Actavis is at most a rebuttable presumption (and perhaps not even
that), as, under Brooke Group, recoupment cannot simply be assumed based
on the monopolist’s sacrifice but rather must be proven.152 Actavis assumes
that it would be irrational for a patentee without market power to make a
large, unexplained reverse payment and thus infers that such a payment
might suggest market power.153 And on the motion to dismiss posture in
Actavis, this inference may be enough to survive dismissal. But not only do
companies sometimes do irrational things, a company might make such a
payment on the mistaken belief that it has market power when in fact, it does
not, among many other potential explanations for the alleged payment. Thus,
while a patentee sacrifice may suggest market power, that suggestion is not
an irrebuttable presumption.
Rather, as in Brooke Group, the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of
showing that the patentee’s alleged sacrifice could actually have been
recouped by anticompetitive effects. This ultimately requires showing that
the patentee would have the market power to exclude competition and thus
recoup its sacrifice. While the Actavis inference may be enough to survive

150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.

209, 224 (1993); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir.
1999).
152. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225–26; see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013) (“To avoid penalizing normal competitive conduct,
then, we require proof not just that the monopolist decided to forsake short-term profits.
Just as in predatory pricing cases, we also require a showing that the monopolist’s refusal
to deal was part of a larger anticompetitive enterprise.”).
153. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157.
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a motion to dismiss, proving anticompetitive effect is required for a plaintiff
to recover damages under Actavis.
VI. PAYING SAVED LITIGATION COSTS IS NOT SUSPECT UNDER ACTAVIS
BECAUSE DOING SO INVOLVES NO ACTUAL SACRIFICE
The next question answered by the sacrifice-based framework is why a
patentee may pay a patent challenger the patentee’s saved litigation costs
when doing so may create a substantial benefit for the challenger —
something a “benefit”-focused approach would consider problematic. By
this point, the answer is perhaps not surprising: there is no patentee sacrifice.
The Patentee Paying the Challenger Its Saved Litigation Costs Provides
a Potentially Significant Benefit to the Patent Challenger, but Is Not a
Reverse Payment
In Actavis, the Court held that a payment representing nothing more than
the patentee’s saved litigation costs would not raise antitrust concerns, as it
would not “bring[] about anticompetitive effects.”154
However, these saved litigation costs can be significant; even the “direct
costs” of lawyers and experts may be in the neighborhood of $10 million per
suit,155 and there may be more than one suit. And by settling, the patent
challenger likewise avoids costs that it would have incurred on its own side,
as the challenger would likewise have needed to pay lawyers and other costs.
Thus, when a patentee pays the challenger the patentee’s saved litigation
costs the challenger may obtain a $20 million or greater benefit in direct costs
alone ($10 million from the patentee and $10 million saved in its own direct
costs). Moreover, such a payment may take the form Actavis considered
suspect: a payment of money.156 Why isn’t that a problem?
This is not even the full tally of litigation savings, in fact, as by settling,
both the patentee and patent challenger may save many times this amount in
“hidden” or “indirect” litigation costs — all other forms of waste from the
litigation process, such as added costs in obtaining financing, impact on
stock price, management time spent on litigation, uncertainty regarding the
expected lifespans of key patents, etc.157 — and the patentee could
154. Id. at 156, 159.
155. See id. at 170 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
156. See id. at 152 (calling the payment of money by the patentee to the patent

challenger “quite different” from traditional forms of settlement).
157. See, e.g., Ironworkers Dist. Council v. Andreotti, No. C.A.-9714-VCG, 2015
Del. Ch. LEXIS 135, at *23 (Del. Ch. Ct. May 8, 2015) (highlighting that corporations
could rightly consider the time, expense, and business impact of litigation, including the
“significant distraction and impairment of morale for directors, officers, and employees
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presumably pass along some or all of these “indirect” saved costs to the
patent challenger in exchange for a settlement.
For example, imagine that a company facing a patent challenge to its
biggest product is simultaneously working on another product in the same
category. Should it devote more effort to promoting its current product or to
bringing the new product to market?158 The answer presumably depends on
the resolution of the patent case, and while that case remains pending the
company, thus, cannot efficiently allocate its resources. This uncertainty is
a “cost” that flows from the fact that the litigation remains ongoing, not from
the risk of an adverse outcome, and is thus a “litigation cost.”159
These indirect costs can be significant; even just the cost of devoting
executive time to litigation, which is only one component of the indirect
costs discussed above, has been estimated at anywhere from fifty-three
percent to seventy-nine percent of the fees paid to an attorney on a case.160
of the Company”); America’s Test Kitchen, Inc. v. Kimball, No. 1684 CV 03325-BLS2,
2018 Mass. Super. LEXIS 45, at *7–8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2018) (analyzing work
product protection regarding the business impact of public litigation); Michaela Keet et
al., Indirect and Invisible Organizational Costs: Making Informed Decisions about
Litigation and Settlement, 50 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL., 49, 51 (2018) (“[A] costbenefit analysis of whether to litigate or settle must account for indirect organizational
costs as well as direct legal expenses”); see also Gant, supra note 49, at 146. See
generally Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to
the Effective Use of Mediation for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1998) (exploring indirect costs).
158. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 790 F.3d 1329 (procedures in patent
litigation “can affect the cost, time, and uncertainty of litigation, and in turn affect
economic activity founded on the presence or absence of enforceable patents”); In re
Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting the cost of uncertainty
regarding title).
159. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156, 159.
160. Keet et al., supra note 157, at 72 (citing Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble”
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J., 115, 143 (1993)). One study
concluded that a very large litigation between Texaco and Pennzoil reduced the overall
value of the two companies by $1–2 billion, due in large part to indirect litigation costs.
David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and
Financial Distress: Evidence From the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation 1–2, 13, 16 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2418, 1987) (explaining the inefficiencies
and waste of resources litigation may cause: “Clearly one explanation [for the loss in
value] is the fees that both companies will pay to the many lawyers, investment bankers,
and advisors that have been retained. Even making generous allowance for these costs,
however, we are unable to account for a large fraction of the loss in combined value. It
appears that there have been additional costs to Texaco’s shareholders from disruptions
in Texaco’s operations, difficulties in obtaining credit, incentive problems created by
fears that Texaco would cease operations, and distraction of top management.”).
Another study discussed a case in which a defendant paid a plaintiff twenty-five times
its demand solely to avoid the costs of litigation. See Keet et al., supra note 157, at 53–
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Paying an amount equivalent to these indirect litigation costs to the patent
challenger could provide that challenger with a substantial benefit, on top of
(again) the benefit the challenger receives from obtaining certainty on its
own end. So why would paying saved litigation costs not raise the same
suspicions identified in Actavis?
That Saved Litigation Costs Are Not a Reverse Payment Cannot Be
Explained on the Basis That They Are De Minimis or Based Only on Their
Procompetitive Benefits
First, start with the unsatisfying answers. Perhaps we may think a $20
million or more benefit to the patent challenger is simply de minimis in a
patent settlement, such that, although it has some anticompetitive effect
courts should simply ignore that effect. And in many cases, it may well be
true that saved litigation costs are too small to have a meaningful impact on
the agreement, as $20 million (for example) is not particularly large relative
to the overall market value of some patented products, particularly in the
pharmaceutical marketplace.
But in some cases, the saved litigation costs can be far higher, particularly
when the parties have lawsuits in dozens or hundreds of jurisdictions around
the world, all of which will require separate litigation. And while some
pharmaceuticals are blockbusters with billions in sales, not all are — and
even if they were, Actavis is not limited to pharmaceuticals even if most
Actavis cases arise in that context. Thus, if Actavis held that saved litigation
costs are always de minimis, that rule may seem arbitrary. When viewed
from the perspective of the patent challenger, there is no obvious reason why
saved litigation costs would be expected to always be sufficiently de minimis
in a patent settlement as to serve as a “safe harbor.”
Alternatively, perhaps we simply think that avoiding litigation costs is
procompetitive, which it surely is; in the indirect costs example above, the
ability to efficiently allocate resources and avoid waste was certainly a
procompetitive outcome.161 But Actavis did not merely hold that avoiding
litigation costs would be procompetitive, it also held that the patentee paying
those avoided litigation costs to the patent challenger does not “bring[] about
anticompetitive effects” notwithstanding that such a payment might provide

54 (citing SIMON VANDE WALLE, PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 268 (2013)).
161. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153 (noting the “general legal policy favoring the
settlement of disputes”); In re 1-800 Contacts, Inc., No. 9372, 2018 FTC LEXIS 184, at
*67–68 (F.T.C. Nov. 7, 2018) (“Settling lawsuits is generally economically efficient.”);
Paladin Assocs. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (avoiding
waste is procompetitive).
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the challenger with significant benefits.162 The procompetitive benefits of
avoiding litigation costs therefore cannot explain why a patentee can transfer
its saved litigation costs to its opponent in settling.
Paying Saved Litigation Costs Is Not a Reverse Payment Because It
Involves No Patentee Sacrifice; Only the Lawyers Lose Out in Such a
Settlement
Instead, again the answer comes from sacrifice and recoupment. Simply
put, where a patentee pays the patent challenger what it would otherwise
waste through litigation, it makes no sacrifice. A patentee who would have
paid its lawyers $10 million, and instead pays its adversary $10 million, has
lost nothing; only its lawyers lose out. And that the patent challenger saves
$10 million is likewise no sacrifice by the patentee; the patentee has no
vested interest in enriching the patent challenger’s lawyers. Likewise, a
patentee that pays an opponent an amount less than the patentee stands to
incur in indirect litigation costs is no worse off; it has avoided waste that
would have cost it far more than it paid, and thus come out ahead. Because
payment of saved litigation costs does not therefore represent a sacrifice, it
cannot serve as a workable surrogate for patent weakness and is not a suspect
reverse payment.163 This is, in short, the classic “win-neutral” agreement,
where the patentee is able to create value for the patent challenger in order
to settle, but without incurring any costs of its own.
A Large Payment Therefore Must Remain Large After Subtracting
Saved Litigation Costs
Recognizing that saved litigation costs are not a sacrifice and thus not a
payment also fatally undermines the argument that a “large” payment under
Actavis is any payment that exceeds saved litigation costs, even by a single
dollar, like some absurd version of The Price Is Right.164 If a patent
162. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156, 159.
163. See In re Impax Labs, Inc., No. 9373, 2019 FTC LEXIS 25, at *56 n.19 (F.T.C.

Mar. 28, 2019) (“Actavis indicates it is appropriate to compare the size of the payment
to the payor’s expected saved litigation costs, not the combined savings . . . . This makes
sense because it is the excess of Endo’s payment over its other savings or justified
benefits that should be understood as directed toward buying market exclusivity.”)
(internal citations omitted).
164. See, e.g., In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 718 (N.D. Ill.
2016) (“A ‘large’ payment is anything more than the value of the avoided litigation costs
plus any other services provided from the generic to the brand manufacturer.”). Although
Opana cited In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, it did so in error, as Lipitor holds exactly
the opposite. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D.N.J. 2014)
(asking “whether [the payment] is ‘large’ once the subtraction of legal fees and other
services provided by generics occurs”).
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challenger is willing to settle for an amount equal to saved litigation costs,
in a settlement which otherwise matches the patentee’s expectations for the
outcome of the litigation and is thus a good result, but will do so only so long
as the patentee lets them keep the pen used to sign the agreement . . . absent
some great sentimental attachment, the patentee should give them the pen.
Yet for those who define “large” in Actavis as “any amount that exceeds
saved litigation costs,” that humble Bic® would transform a lawful settlement
into a large reverse payment, on the theory that no one would enter such a
deal absent anticompetitive intent.165 The idea that the patentee’s willingness
to sacrifice a 98-cent Bic® pen could, by barely pushing the payment outside
of saved litigation costs, serve as a workable surrogate for a patent’s
weakness is absurd; it cannot do anything of the sort.
Instead, as discussed above, Actavis notes that a number of factors go into
whether a large payment is substantial enough to provide meaningful
information regarding (a) the strength or weakness of the underlying patent
case and (b) market power.166 Because paying saved litigation costs to your
opponent is not a “reverse payment” — large or otherwise — the first dollar
that exceeds saved litigation costs cannot suffice to tell us anything
meaningful about the patent or the market. Instead, a “large” payment under
Actavis must be one that remains large “once the subtraction of legal fees
and other services provided by generics occurs,” as it is only this portion that
can ever fairly be called a patentee sacrifice.167

165. It is not clear whether courts adopting the The Price Is Right rule would then
treat the 98-cent value of the pen as an anticompetitive harm by itself, and ask exactly
how many milliseconds of delay 98 cents can purchase, or whether they would seek to
bring the entire payment of saved litigation costs outside of the “safe harbor” on that
basis. If it is the latter, then a payment of $10,000,000 representing saved litigation costs
would be a reverse payment of $0, whereas a payment of $10,000,000.98 would see the
entire amount treated as suspect. Any such rule would be difficult to defend, to say the
very least.
166. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159 (characterizing Actavis factors as “size, its scale in
relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing
justification”); Barba v. Shire US, No. 13-21158-CIV, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182548,
at *9–10, 15 (S.D. Fl. Jan. 19, 2016) (rejecting the notion that a reverse payment was
large if it exceeded saved litigation costs, and considering other factors:
“Ultimately . . . there is no actual definition of ‘large’ in Actavis. Instead, there is a series
of factors to consider . . . .”); see also supra Parts III.B, VI.
167. In re Lipitor, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 543; see also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94
F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D. Conn. 2015) (“Even if the payments exceed avoided litigation
costs, the Actavis factors — the size of the payments, their scale in relation to litigation
costs, their independence from other services for which they might be fair consideration,
and any other convincing justification — still matter.”); Gant, supra note 49, at 144–46
(explaining the role of “largeness” in the Actavis analysis).
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VII. “TRADITIONAL” COMPROMISES ARE NOT SUSPECT UNDER ACTAVIS
BECAUSE THEIR FORM PREVENTS A COURT FROM INFERRING
ANTICOMPETITIVE INTENT OR HARM
We now turn to the final mystery of Actavis, which is again explained by
Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko. Actavis holds that “traditional”
forms of settlement, such as a compromise of damages, should not be
considered reverse payments notwithstanding that they may involve the
patentee giving up something of value that benefits the patent challenger.168
For example, if a patentee accepts $40 million for a damages claim it has
against the patent challenger rather than the full $100 million it is claiming,
this could be seen as a “payment” of $60 million to the challenger, but under
Actavis would not be an antitrust concern.169
But why not?170 The answer appears to be that Actavis sought, as a matter
of policy, to limit the reach of antitrust scrutiny to protect settlement.171 To
do so, Actavis requires courts to identify forms of agreement that are
commonplace and traditional as a screen before applying antitrust
scrutiny.172 Put differently, Actavis’s exclusion of “traditional” and
“commonplace” settlements from antitrust scrutiny is a guardrail designed to
keep antitrust law from undermining procompetitive patent settlements and
thus to keep antitrust law from improperly deterring competition.173
Trinko involved a similar guardrail. In theory many refusals to deal with
rivals could be the basis for an antitrust claim under a sufficiently overbroad
reading of Sherman Act Section 2. However, the Court in Trinko worried
that overly restricting the right of a company to choose its business partners
could not only impair the ability to structure businesses in competitive ways,

168. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147, 156.
169. Id. at 151–52; see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261

F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (raising the issue of whether this should be
considered a reverse payment). See generally Mark Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting
Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1033 (2003) (arguing
that often in patent settlements there is consideration; therefore, reverse payments may
not in fact always be anticompetitive).
170. See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 2022–23 (2016) (“[P]reserving the ability to settle patent cases in
the traditional way seems rather arbitrary . . . .”).
171. Actavis recognized the importance of settlement. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 146, 154
(acknowledging the “public policy favoring settlement of disputes” and “recogiz[ing] the
value of settlements”); see also supra note 1 (collecting authority on settlement).
172. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154.
173. The Federal Circuit continues to apply Noerr Pennington immunity to attempted
patent settlements — at least outside of the Hatch-Waxman Act context — in light of the
difference between “routine[,] unsuccessful offers to settle” and the reverse payments in
Actavis. See Indus. Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., 716 F. App’x 949, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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but indeed actively promote collusion.174 Trinko thus limited antitrust
scrutiny to those “refusal to deal” cases that involved a prior profitable
course of dealing and/or a refusal to sell a competitor a product otherwise
available at retail.175 Similarly, although some have suggested that even
above-cost pricing may be “predatory,” Brooke Group and similar cases hold
that only below-cost pricing is potentially actionable, since “mistaken
inferences in [predatory pricing] cases . . . are especially costly, because they
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”176 The
Court, in these cases, thus limited antitrust scrutiny to “forms” of conduct
that could be more readily identified, rather than asking courts to secondguess all possibly-suspect conduct.177
Like Trinko and Brooke Group, Actavis involves a normally
procompetitive activity that in the vast majority of cases will tend only to
benefit competition: Settlement.178 As discussed at the outset of this article,
settlement is typically beneficial not only to the parties but also the courts
and the general public, as it avoids litigation costs and judicial waste, and in
the patent context may permit earlier entry of competition. Courts should
not seek to discourage such procompetitive settlement conduct any more
than they would discourage low pricing in Brooke Group or independent
business decisions in Trinko. But, as in Aspen Skiing, there could be
circumstances where this normally-beneficial activity could theoretically be
problematic, and there must be some way to find these exceptions without
throwing the procompetitive baby out with the antitrust bathwater.179
The Supreme Court in Actavis thus held that the presence of a large,
unexplained reverse payment raises the possibility of antitrust scrutiny.180
However, there will likely be many traditional forms of compromise that
may appear to contain a “payment” but that actually reflect procompetitive
compromise, such as the example the Supreme Court gave of compromising

174. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410, 415–16 (2004); see also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)
(“[T]he [Sherman] [A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal . . . .”).
175. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409–10; see also supra note 37.
176. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986);
see also supra note 34.
177. See supra note 32.
178. See FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 148, 154 (2013).
179. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409–10 (discussing Aspen Skiing); see also Novell, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining how antitrust law
establishes rules to address such conduct).
180. See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159.
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a damages claim for less than the claimed amount.181 Actavis, like Brooke
Group and Trinko, thus adopted a guardrail that would not extend antitrust
scrutiny to the broad range of “traditional,” “commonplace,” and “familiar”
agreements that such scrutiny might otherwise inadvertently deter.182
However, it still allowed scrutiny for a limited set of “unusual” settlements
the Court thought might raise concerns.183 Courts should therefore look to
whether the agreements before them are of a type and form that has
traditionally been used to reach compromise between litigants before
declaring them to be “reverse payments” under Actavis, and should not
extend Actavis to the types of agreements that are traditional and
commonplace ways to reach a settlement.184
Finally, it is no answer to suggest that the antitrust laws would never
consider the form of the agreement in determining the potential for
anticompetitive effect; on the contrary, they have long done so. While the
antitrust laws often favor substance over form,185 in Trinko the Court looked
to the form of the refusal to deal (i.e., whether there was a prior profitable
course of dealing between the parties) to provide critical guidance regarding
the potential reach of the antitrust laws,186 and in Brooke Group the Court
focused on the form of the pricing (i.e., above or below cost) to do the
same.187 Actavis likewise makes clear that the structure of the transaction is
a critical guidepost, as “settlements taking these commonplace forms have
not been thought for that reason alone subject to antitrust liability.”188
Indeed, Actavis contrasts such “forms” against the unusual “forms” of
settlement that might raise antitrust issues.189 In other words, far from
181. See id. at 151–52.
182. See id. at 158.
183. See id. at 152. Indeed, the FTC recognized this in Actavis, arguing that Actavis

should not apply to “a wide range of ordinary settlement practices.” See Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 10, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL
1099171.
184. See Gant, supra note 49, at 147–60.
185. In re 1-800 Contacts, Inc., No. 9372, 2018 FTC LEXIS 184, at *37–38 (F.T.C.
Nov. 7, 2018) (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010); Copperweld
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 760 (1984)) (stating antitrust laws “aim[] at
substance rather than form”).
186. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409–10 (2004).
187. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993).
188. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added); see also id. (acknowledging “familiar
settlement forms”).
189. Id. at 147–48 (“That form of settlement is unusual . . . . [T]here is reason for
concern that settlements taking this form tend to have significant adverse effects on
competition.”).
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ignoring form, the sacrifice and recoupment framework uses form as a screen
to avoid over-enforcement of the antitrust laws, and has done so for decades.
Actavis therefore follows Trinko and Brooke Group in limiting the reach
of antitrust laws to traditional forms of conduct unlikely to raise antitrust
concerns, and courts that refuse to appreciate or apply these limitations will
apply Actavis in ways the Supreme Court did not intend.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Courts have long struggled to determine when Actavis would require
applying antitrust scrutiny to patent settlements and when it would not. But
while Actavis is far from a picture of clarity, it can be properly applied —
and its key mysteries all solved — simply by understanding that the case
operates through the same sacrifice and recoupment framework used in
Brooke Group, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko. Viewed through this lens, Actavis
— while still an objectionable decision that the Supreme Court should revisit
— can at least be applied in a way that makes sense and comports with
longstanding antitrust principles.

